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Improving Regulation Through Incremental 
Adjustment 
 
Robert L. Glicksman* 
Sidney A. Shapiro** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Reform of environmental and other regulation has been a popular 
topic for academics, think-tanks, and interested parties for the last two 
decades.  Claiming that existing regulation is excessive and irrational, 
critics have successfully convinced Congress and the White House to 
implement a plethora of procedural requirements to analyze a proposed 
regulation before it is promulgated.1  In our recent book, Risk Regulation 
at Risk,2 we argued that the previous initiatives address the possibility of 
regulatory failure on the wrong end of the regulatory policy 
implementation process.  Current efforts to rationalize environmental and 
other health and safety regulation at the “front end” of the regulatory 
process are doomed to fail because of moral, methodological, and 
informational limitations.3  We suggested that one way of improving 
regulation would be to rely on incremental adjustments in regulation on 
the “back end” of the regulatory process.4  One important advantage of 
proceeding in this manner is that regulatory policy is adjusted in light of 
its actual impact, as compared to the significant guesswork that is 
required to use front-end analysis.  In this manner, a back-end adjustment 
process is consistent with the pragmatic approach to public policy that 
we advocated in the book.5 
                                                     
 * Robert W. Wagstaff Professor of Law, University of Kansas; Member Scholar, Center for 
Progressive Regulation.  The authors thank the participants in the symposium of which this article is 
a part for their useful contributions to this article. 
 ** John M. Rounds Professor of Law, University of Kansas (through Spring 2004); Member 
Scholar, Center for Progressive Regulation; University Distinguished Chair in Law, Wake Forest 
University School of Law (Fall 2004–present). 
 1. See infra notes 12–23 and accompanying text. 
 2. SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A 
PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003). 
 3. Id. at 71–72. 
 4. Id. at 177; see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, The Missing Perspective, 
ENVTL. F., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 42. 
 5. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 177. 
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 This article addresses in more detail the potential of two types of 
back-end processes: (1) deadline extensions and (2) waivers, exceptions, 
and variances.6  Our analysis proceeds in three steps.  Part II describes 
the almost exclusive focus of regulatory reformers on the front end of the 
process.  Part III offers a close examination of five federal statutes that 
provide opportunities for the two types of adjustments we are studying.  
The results confirm our earlier assertion that Congress has authorized 
agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Interior 
Department to make these types of back-end adjustments available in a 
variety of contexts and for a variety of reasons.7  Our analysis reveals 
that Congress has established six different grounds for back-end 
adjustment, and we assess the potential for each of these grounds to 
improve regulatory policy.  Although we recommend the imposition of 
conditions on the issuance of some of these back-end adjustments, we 
find that these adjustments are generally consistent with the 
precautionary tilt of the statutes in which they are located because they 
still require the regulated entity to do the best it can to protect people and 
the environment.  Where such protective mechanisms are absent, we urge 
that the statutes be amended to include them. 
 Part IV analyzes the procedures by which requests for back-end 
adjustments are currently processed.  We find that agencies consider 
most applications for back-end adjustments using informal procedures 
that include public notice and solicitation of public comments, although 
in a few instances, more formal procedures apply.  We favor the informal 
approach because it is an efficient way for agencies to respond to the 
issues raised by requests for back-end adjustments and because more 
elaborate procedures are not necessary to promote rational decision-
making, given the nature of the issues likely to be raised in back-end 
adjustment proceedings.  We are concerned, however, about the extent to 
which effective public participation will occur under these procedures.  
We therefore endorse two steps to enhance the transparency of back-end 
adjustment decision-making: the establishment of electronic reading 
rooms and the issuance by agencies of annual reports on back-end 
                                                     
 6. Other back-end adjustment mechanisms discussed in our book are the subjects of other 
articles in this symposium.  See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation: Is 
Enforcement Discretion the Answer?, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. ___ (2004); J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive 
Management Seriously: A Case Study for the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. ___ 
(2004). 
 7. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 158–59. 
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adjustments.8  We argue that these two mechanisms will facilitate 
involvement by public interest groups and interested citizens by allowing 
them to prioritize the adjustment proceedings in which they wish to 
become involved.  The result is likely to be enhanced agency 
accountability and reduced opportunities for agency abuse of the back-
end adjustment process. 
 
II. THE FRONT-END EFFORT TO RATIONALIZE REGULATION  
  
 Critics of environmental and other risk regulation have engaged in a 
long-standing and vigorous effort to criticize regulatory policy as 
irrational and excessive.9  We and others have attempted to demonstrate 
that most of these criticisms are wide of the mark.10  Nevertheless, these 
complaints have become the foundation on which the White House and 
Congress have built an extensive apparatus of front-end analysis of 
proposed and final regulations. 
 Since the Reagan Administration, there has been a series of 
executive orders that establish analytical reporting requirements 
monitored by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).11  President Reagan 
issued Executive Order 12,291,12 which required executive agencies to 
assess the benefits and costs of proposed rules, followed by executive 
orders requiring assessment of family, federalism, and property 
impacts.13  In the first Bush Administration, the White House required 
                                                     
8 We discuss these proposals further in Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. 
Glicksman, The APA and the Back-End of Regulation:  Procedures for Informal 
Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1159 (2004). 
 9. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION (1993); RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM 
REGULATION (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996).  
 10. See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE 
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, 
at 73–91; Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345 (2004). 
 11. Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in 
Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 708 (2000). 
 12. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 635 
(2000) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866). 
 13. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1989), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 636–
37 (2000); Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 636 
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executive agencies to perform a preliminary cost-benefit analysis to 
justify placement of a proposed regulation on an agency’s regulatory 
agenda,14 and it extended Executive Order 12,291 to almost every form 
of agency action except adjudication.15  The Clinton Administration 
issued its own executive order requiring agencies to assess the costs and 
benefits of proposed and final rules, and it established a review process 
similar to the ones used by previous administrations.16  President George 
W. Bush has continued the Clinton executive order.17 
 Congress has also been busy creating front-end requirements.  In 
1980, it passed the Regulatory Flexibility Act, which requires a 
regulatory flexibility analysis whenever an agency proposes a rule that 
may have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
businesses, organizations, or governments.18  In 1995, Congress passed 
the Regulatory Accountability and Reform Act, which requires agencies 
to prepare a regulatory impact assessment before they promulgate a 
proposed or final regulation that includes a “mandate” resulting in costs 
over $100 million annually on state, local, or tribal governments or the 
private sector.19  In 2001, Congress passed the Information Quality Act,20 
which requires agencies to establish procedures to ensure the 
“objectivity, utility, and integrity” of information “disseminated” by the 
federal government, and which gave OMB oversight authority over 
agency compliance with the guidelines.21  In February 2002, OMB issued 
                                                                                                                       
(2000); Exec. Order No. 12,606, 3 C.F.R. 241 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 606 
(2000). 
 14.  See Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1994). 
 15. Id.  
 16. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 638–
42 (2000). 
 17. See Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, 
the White House, to the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 
Regulatory Review Plan (Jan. 20, 2001) (adopting the meaning of “regulation” set forth in Exec. 
Order No. 12,866), available at 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, also available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regreview_plan.pdf; see also Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 
C.F.R. 204 (2002) (amending Exec. Order No. 12,866). 
 18. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2000). 
 19. 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2000).  In 1996, Congress amended the Regulatory Flexibility Act to 
establish judicial review of agency compliance with some of its requirements.  See Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 242, 110 Stat. 857, 865–66 
(1996) (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 611 (2000)). 
 20. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 
106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763A-154 (2001). 
 21. Id. §§ 515(a), (b)(1). 
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guidelines that instructed agencies how to comply with the legislation.22  
The guidelines established new analytical requirements regarding the 
dissemination of information, including the dissemination of information 
as part of the rulemaking process.23 
 All of these initiatives are part of what Debra Stone calls the 
“rationality project,”24 which is an effort to rationalize regulation on the 
basis of “rational choice theory, microeconomic efficiency models, and 
cost-benefit analysis.”25  There are three difficulties with this effort.  
First, analysts are subject to “bounded rationality.”26  We simply lack the 
information necessary to make accurate judgments using these 
techniques.27  Thus, “[a]t its best, cost-benefit analysis usually offers 
only a rough approximation of the actual costs and benefits of regulatory 
action—too rough for decision-making.”28  Second, the multiple 
demands imposed by these analytical requirements have ossified the 
rulemaking process, slowing the promulgation of regulations to a crawl.29  
Finally, the use of cost-benefit analysis and other similar techniques 
invites analysts to implement normative values that are at odds with the 
statutes that EPA and other risk agencies implement.  Whereas cost-
benefit analysis seeks only the most economically efficient level of 
regulation, risk statutes almost universally implement a different and 
broader moral perspective.30 In these statutes, Congress has expressly 
rejected the idea that economic efficiency is the only value to determine 
regulatory policy.  Instead, it made protecting people and the 
                                                     
 22. Office of Management and Budget, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, 
Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 
8452 (Feb. 22, 2002). 
 23. Sidney A. Shapiro, Information Data Quality and Environmental Protection: The Perils of 
Reform by Appropriations Rider, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 339, 346–49 (2004).  
Under the authority of the IQA,, OMB also issued a bulletin requiring extensive use of peer review 
prior to the dissemination of information, including information used in the rulemaking process.  
Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2,664 (Jan. 14, 2005); see Sidney 
A. Shapiro, OMB’s Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,064, 10,0064–65 
(2004). 
 24. Shapiro, Counter-Reformation, supra note 11, at 706 (citing Debra A. Stone, Clinical 
Authority in the Construction of Citizenship, in PUBLIC POLICY FOR DEMOCRACY 45, 46 (Helen 
Ingram & Stephen Rathgeb Smith eds., 1993)). 
 25. Id. 
 26. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 22–24. 
 27. Id. at 65. 
 28. Shapiro & Glicksman, The Missing Perspective, supra note 4, at 50. 
 29. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 134–36; see Thomas O. McGarity, Some 
Thoughts On “Deossifying” The Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1389–90 (1992) 
(documenting the slowdown in rulemaking). 
 30. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 32. 
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environment a priority by requiring risk producers to use their “best 
efforts” to reduce risks.31  Unlike cost-benefit analysis, this commitment 
recognizes and honors the intrinsic value of protecting humans and the 
environment while still taking costs into consideration.32   
 Readers seeking a more elaborate defense of these propositions will 
need to look at our book and similar efforts by other scholars.33  For 
purposes of this article, we assume that the problems of rationalizing 
policy at the front end of the process require us to look elsewhere for 
ways to fine-tune regulation.  In our book, among other suggestions, we 
proposed that back-end adjustments have considerable promise.34  Our 
principal argument was that such adjustments occur in light of real world 
experience, which gives regulators concrete information about the impact 
of a regulation.35  Nevertheless, we also observed that there were certain 
potential difficulties with this approach, including the potential that 
regulators could gut a regulation by handing out undeserved exemptions 
and exceptions.36  We therefore urged that it was essential that agencies 
be accountable for the back-end adjustments that they make.37 
 While the front-end effort to rationalize regulation has received most 
of the attention, less attention has been paid to the regime of back-end 
adjustments that Congress has authorized.  This article seeks to 
understand better the manner in which Congress has structured existing 
back-end adjustments and the extent to which agency decision-makers 
responsible for considering requests for back-end adjustments are 
accountable for their decisions.   
 
III. THE BACK-END EFFORT TO RATIONALIZE REGULATION  
 
 This section considers the degree of regulatory rationality of 
presently-structured back-end adjustments.  We first describe the 
potential regulatory advantages of back-end adjustments.  We then 
survey the back-end provisions of five federal health, safety, and 
environmental statutes that provide opportunities for back-end 
adjustments.  Our goal is to determine the conditions under which back-
end adjustments are currently made and to assess whether these 
                                                     
 31. Id. at 52. 
 32. Id. at 51–54. 
 33. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 10. 
 34. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 158–76. 
 35. Id. at 170–72. 
 36. Id. at 172–74. 
 37. Id. at 174–76. 
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provisions are likely to produce the regulatory advantages that we have 
identified. 
 
A. Potential Advantages 
 
 A back-end adjustment process has a number of policy advantages.  
First, it permits agencies to preserve relatively stringent baseline risk-
reduction standards while still accommodating concerns that the 
application of these stringent rules will cause irrational or unfair results 
in particular cases.38  As one court has explained, “a regulatory system 
which allows flexibility, and a lessening of firm proscriptions in a proper 
case, can lend strength to the system as a whole.”39  Regulators can make 
case-by-case adjustments instead of initially watering down standards in 
anticipation that a general rule may be counterproductive or irrational in 
some circumstances.40 
 Second, a back-end process addresses the ossification of the 
rulemaking process and the problem of bounded rationality in several 
ways.  Agencies issue back-end adjustments after a rule has been 
adopted.  The availability of these adjustments can avoid delay in the 
issuance of a rule of widespread applicability because an agency can 
promulgate a rule and rely on regulated entities to alert it to 
implementation problems by filing individual requests for relief.41  A 
back-end process therefore serves as a check on the rationality of rules 
that are promulgated.  If an agency receives a significant number of 
meritorious applications, it may suggest that a regulation is flawed and 
requires adjustment.42  Further, a back-end process gives regulated 
entities a strong incentive to produce evidence that an adjustment in a 
rule is justified.  Since these firms are the most likely entities to possess 
information bearing on the unique aspects of their situation that justify an 
adjustment, this process addresses the problem of bounded rationality.43  
Moreover, because incremental adjustments limit the scope of factual 
                                                     
 38. See DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL 
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 197 (1999) (“The existence of an escape valve might 
even strengthen support for the environmental baseline by making it clear that later 
adjustments would be available.”). 
 39. Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 40. See Jim Rossi, Making Policy Through the Waiver of Regulations at the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 255, 277 (1995) (noting that administrative equity 
“eschews the ability of rules to provide universal justice”). 
 41. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 170–71. 
 42. Id. at 172. 
 43. Id. at 171. 
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inquiry, they demand fewer analytical resources and take less time than 
addressing the same problems in rulemaking,44 which frees up agency 
resources for implementing the agency’s statutory mission.  Unlike 
rulemaking, in which regulators must attempt to anticipate problems 
before they occur in the context of writing general rules, incremental 
adjustments permit regulators to consider concrete problems, one at a 
time, in the context of specific circumstances.  The back-end process can 
also make adjustments to circumstances that cannot be anticipated at the 
time a rule was written.45  A back-end adjustment process can also 
reduce the number of challenges to regulations and the need to use 
enforcement proceedings to interpret rules and make policy.46 
 Third, a back-end adjustment process can increase the legitimacy of 
the regulatory program that contains the back-end process by reducing 
the frustrations likely to result from the application of regulatory 
requirements in ways that produce harsh or anomalous results.  Thus, 
Judge Harold Leventhal argued in another regulatory context prior to the 
adoption of any of the laws analyzed in this article that: 
 
[A] rule is more likely to be undercut if it does not in some way take 
into account considerations of hardship, equity, or more effective 
implementation of overall policy, considerations that an agency cannot 
realistically ignore, at least on a continuing basis.  The limited safety 
valve permits a more rigorous adherence to an effective regulation.47 
 
 Finally, but hardly least of all, a back-end process is one of the ways 
that regulators can take costs into account when Congress eschews the 
use of a cost-benefit test to establish the level of regulation.  As we 
explain in our book, Congress has rejected the use of a cost-benefit 
analysis to establish the level of risk reduction in almost every health, 
safety, and environmental statute.48  Instead, Congress typically requires 
agencies to take costs into account in one of two ways.  In open-ended 
                                                     
 44. Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the 
Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 196. 
 45. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
393, 430 (1981) (noting how an incremental process accommodates the “tide of technical and social 
change”); see also Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 537 F.2d 642, 647 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating 
that absent the availability of variances, “there is no guarantee that [a regulatory defect that arose 
because regulations were ill-suited to individual plants] could be effectively remedied if it 
occurred”). 
 46. Schuck, supra note 44, at 283 (“By reducing the hardships and the sense of injustice 
suffered by those to whom a rule applies, exceptions diminish the pressure to challenge the rule 
itself.”).  
 47. WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
 48. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 44. 
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balancing, agencies consider compliance costs as one of the factors to be 
considered in establishing the level of regulation, but there is no 
obligation to balance costs and benefits.49  In constrained balancing, an 
agency chooses the level of protection by identifying and patterning 
regulatory objectives upon some model technology.50  In this manner, 
Congress limits the authority of agencies to impose abatement costs 
according to the availability of the technology.51  Our book contends that 
there are important moral and practical reasons for using these regulatory 
approaches instead of a cost-benefit test.52  Because a back-end 
adjustment process that authorizes hardship-based adjustments offers 
another way to take costs into consideration without relying on a cost-
benefit test, it supports the rationality of the current regulatory 
approaches.53 
 
B. Current Provisions 
 
 This section analyzes whether current back-end provisions are likely 
to produce the policy advantages that we have identified.  To make this 
determination, we surveyed five federal health, safety, and 
environmental statutes that provide opportunities for back-end 
adjustments: the Clean Water Act (CWA),54 the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA),55 the Clean Air Act (CAA),56 the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act),57 and the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA).58 
 Our survey finds that Congress has provided for back-end 
adjustments in the form of deadline extensions and waivers, variances, 
and exceptions in all five statutes under consideration.  A table 
summarizing these findings can be found in Appendix I.  A deadline 
extension, as its name implies, is an adjustment of the date by which a 
regulated entity must comply with its regulatory obligations.  A waiver, 
exception, or variance provides relief for a regulated entity from 
                                                     
 49. Id. at 39. 
 50. Id. at 37.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 46–72. 
 53. We discuss hardship-based adjustments infra Part III.B.2. 
 54. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6939e (2000). 
 56. Id. §§ 7401–7671q. 
 57. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2000). 
 58. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000). 
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regulatory obligations otherwise applicable to it by affording it treatment 
that differs from the treatment afforded other entities subject to the same 
obligations.  A variance or exception may subject the entity applying for 
the back-end adjustment to more lenient pollution controls, for example.  
A waiver or exemption may even exempt an entity altogether from the 
need to comply.59  Congress has made these back-end adjustments 
available under the statutes we have reviewed on at least six different 
policy grounds.60  Congress permits back-end adjustments on the basis of 
lack of adverse impact on the environment, hardship or technological 
unavailability, the desire to provide incentives to develop new pollution 
control or risk-reducing technology, fairness, conflicts between 
environmental and other social policy values, and, in at least one 
instance, in open-ended situations.61   
 We conclude that most, although not all, of these provisions provide 
policy adjustments that should improve regulatory rationality.  Our 
analysis is organized according to the five policy grounds on which the 
various types of adjustments are available.   
 
1. Harm-Based Adjustments 
 
                                                     
 59. It is theoretically possible for an agency to subject a regulated entity to more stringent 
regulatory requirements by issuing a variance at the behest of an environmental public interest 
group.  EPA’s CWA regulations, for example, explain that it may be necessary to adjust the 
regulatory effluent limitation regulations on a case-by-case basis to “make them either more or less 
stringent as they apply to certain dischargers within an industrial category or subcategory” to take 
account of data that EPA never considered in issuing the regulations and that render a particular 
discharger’s situation fundamentally different from the ones EPA considered in the rulemaking.  40 
C.F.R. § 125.30(b) (2003); see also id. § 125.31(c) (setting forth the criteria for issuance of 
alternative effluent limitations that are “more stringent than required by national limits”).  In 
practice, however, back-end adjustments more commonly take the form of more lenient (as opposed 
to more stringent) treatment. 
 60. Agency regulations may create additional opportunities for back-end adjustments, such as 
situations in which new information becomes available.  See, e.g., id. § 233.36(a)(5) (authorizing the 
modification of dredge and fill permits issued under § 404 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, on the 
basis of significant new information that would have justified the imposition of different permit 
conditions had it been available at the time of issuance).  Cf. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(5) (2003) 
(authorizing limited adjustments to incidental take permits under the ESA in the event of changed or 
unforeseen circumstances). 
 61. The agencies sometimes make back-end adjustments available even if Congress has not 
specifically authorized them.  The Supreme Court endorsed EPA’s creation of fundamentally 
different factor (FDF) variances from the CWA’s effluent limitations for point sources in E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 126–36 (1977).  See also EPA v. Nat’l Crushed 
Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 73–85 (1980) (considering the appropriate grounds for issuance of an FDF 
variance).  More recently, the Second Circuit upheld EPA’s authority to issue variances from CWA 
regulatory requirements on new cooling water intake structures.  Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 
174, 186–87 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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 Harm-based adjustments provide relief to a regulated entity from 
regulatory obligations that would otherwise apply to it in a situation in 
which the regulated activity does not create the types of risks to health, 
safety, or the environment that the regulatory program was designed to 
minimize. In such a situation, requiring compliance with the applicable 
obligations could be regarded as “treatment for treatment’s sake” in that 
the harm that the statute seeks to avoid will not occur even in the absence 
of compliance.62 
 
a. Availability 
 
 All five statutes contain examples of harm-based adjustments.  Our 
survey found the following examples of such adjustments. 
 CWA.  The CWA is illustrative of the availability of harm-based 
back-end adjustments under the federal environmental laws.  The statute 
authorizes EPA, with the concurrence of the state, to “modify” the 
second phase of the technology-based effluent limitations for point 
sources discharging certain kinds of nonconventional pollutants upon a 
showing that the modification (i.e., the more lenient treatment sought) 
will not interfere with the maintenance or attainment of water quality that 
assures protection of public water supplies, assures protection and 
propagation of a balanced population of fish and wildlife, and allows 
recreational activities in and on the water.63  In addition, the applicant 
must show that the modification will not result in discharges “which may 
reasonably be anticipated to pose an unacceptable risk to human health 
or the environment because of bioaccumulation, persistency in the 
environment, acute [or] chronic toxicity . . . , or synergistic 
propensities.”64  In other words, if a point source is able to show that 
                                                     
 62. Industry has long criticized uniform pollution controls such as the CWA’s technology-
based effluent limitations as imposing “treatment for treatment’s sake” in that the treatment required 
by the regulation is unnecessary to protect the resource in question.  See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, 
Water Quality and Agriculture: Assessing Alternative Futures, 25 ENVIRONS L. & POL’Y J. 77, 89 
(2002); William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States—State, 
Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789–1972, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 193 (2003); Oliver A. Houck, Of 
Bats, Birds, and B-A-T:  The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 MISS. L.J. 403, 417 
(1994); Christopher H. Schroeder, Clear Consensus, Ambiguous Commitment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
1876, 1886 (2000) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM (1999)).  
 63. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g)(2)(c) (2000). 
 64. Id.  This water quality-based modification only goes so far.  The statute bars EPA from 
issuing a modification that excuses compliance with the first phase of the technology-based effluent 
limitations.  Id. § 1311(g)(2)(A).  In addition, a modification may not be issued if it will result in 
additional requirements on other, presumably downstream, point or nonpoint sources.  Id. § 
1311(g)(2)(B). 
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compliance with effluent limitations less stringent than the technology-
based limitations that apply to other point sources in the same industry 
will not adversely affect the water quality goals of the statute, it may be 
eligible for individualized regulatory relief.  The statute authorizes 
modifications based on similar grounds for publicly-owned treatment 
works discharging into marine waters.65 
 Similarly, the CWA authorizes EPA or a state administering the 
permit program for point sources to impose an alternative effluent 
limitation if it can show that any effluent limitation for the control of the 
thermal component of any discharge will require controls more stringent 
than necessary to assure the protection and propagation of shellfish, fish, 
and wildlife in the receiving water.  The alternative limitation must 
assure the same degree of protection and propagation.66 
 RCRA.  RCRA contains a plethora of mechanisms for individualized 
adjustments based on the lack of potential for the regulated activity to 
cause environmental harm.  RCRA requires EPA to compile a list of 
hazardous wastes based on listing criteria that include factors such as 
toxicity, persistence, . . . degradability in nature, [and] potential for 
accumulation in tissue.”67  Entities engaged in the generation, 
transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of listed wastes are subject 
to a variety of regulatory standards issued by EPA.68  An individual 
facility may petition EPA to exclude a waste generated at that facility 
from listing.69  Although the statute does not explicitly provide the 
grounds for the granting of a delisting petition, EPA regulations require 
that the petitioner demonstrate that the waste produced at the petitioner’s 
facility does not meet any of the criteria under which the waste was listed 
as hazardous.70  The CAA contains a similar petition process for the 
delisting of pollutants that Congress or EPA has designated as hazardous 
air pollutants.71 
 RCRA prohibits the land disposal of certain hazardous wastes unless 
EPA determines that the prohibition is not required to protect “human 
health and the environment for as long as the waste remains 
                                                     
 65. Id. § 1311(h)(2). 
 66. Id. § 1326(a).  For a discussion of § 316 thermal discharge variances, see generally 2 
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 574–77 (1986). 
 67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921(a), (b)(1) (2000). 
 68. Id. §§ 6922–6924. 
 69. Id. § 6921(f)(1). 
 70. 40 C.F.R. § 260.22(a)(1) (2003).  EPA regulations also provide a mechanism for the filing 
of petitions to add a hazardous waste to the list.  Id. § 260.23.  That mechanism is available to 
environmental public interest groups. 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(3).  Petitions also may be filed under this provision to add substances 
to the list. 
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hazardous.”72  The statute further provides that a method of land disposal 
may not be deemed protective of human health and the environment 
unless, “upon application by an interested person, it has been 
demonstrated to [EPA], to a reasonable degree of certainty, that there 
will be no migration of hazardous constituents from the disposal unit or 
injection zone for as long as the wastes remain hazardous.”73  RCRA 
therefore creates a back-end adjustment mechanism to the land disposal 
prohibition.  If a regulated entity can convince EPA that a particular form 
of land disposal of a particular listed hazardous waste will not allow the 
waste to migrate in such a way as to threaten human health or the 
environment, EPA is authorized to lift the prohibition on land disposal. 
 EPA also has the authority to exempt from groundwater monitoring 
requirements any structure which EPA finds does not receive or contain 
liquid waste, is designed to operate to exclude liquid from precipitation 
or other runoff, uses multiple leak detection systems, and provides for 
continuing operation and maintenance of these leak detection systems 
during operation, closure, and post-closure.74  EPA may issue the 
exemption only if it concludes that, as a result of these conditions, there 
is a reasonable certainty that hazardous constituents will not migrate 
beyond the outer layer of containment before the end of the required 
post-closure monitoring period.75  This exemption is another example of 
a back-end adjustment that becomes available if EPA determines that the 
health and environmental risks that the regulatory program was designed 
to avoid do not exist in a particular situation.76 
 Still another harm-based adjustment provision in RCRA relates to 
the use of hazardous waste as fuel.  RCRA requires that EPA issue 
regulatory standards applicable to facilities that produce a fuel from any 
listed hazardous waste and to facilities that burn any such fuel for 
purposes of energy recovery as may be necessary to protect human 
health and the environment.77  EPA may exempt from these standards 
(and from related labeling and recordkeeping requirements) any facility 
                                                     
 72. The statute only actually bans the land disposal of hazardous waste that is not treated in 
conformity with treatment standards issued by EPA.  Id. §§ 6924(d)(1), (e)(1), (g)(5). 
 73. Id. §§ 6924(d)(1), (e)(1), (g)(5). 
 74. Id. § 6924(p). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See also id. § 6925(j)(4) (authorizing EPA to modify a statutory prohibition on the receipt, 
storage, or treatment of hazardous waste in surface impoundments not in compliance with statutory 
minimum technological requirements if the owner or operator of such an impoundment demonstrates 
that the impoundment is located, designed, and operated such that no hazardous constituent will 
migrate into groundwater or surface water). 
 77. Id. § 6924(q)(1). 
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which burns de minimis quantities of hazardous waste as fuel, provided 
EPA determines the incendiary device sufficiently destroys and removes 
waste so as to ensure protection of human health and the environment.78  
Under such circumstances, presumably, compliance with the regulatory 
standards is not necessary to avoid risks of health or environmental harm. 
 CAA.  The CAA also contains adjustment provisions designed to 
eliminate regulatory restrictions that EPA deems unnecessary to achieve 
air quality objectives or that may even impair the pursuit of clean air.79  
The 1990 amendments to the statute required all states that had not yet 
achieved the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for carbon 
monoxide to revise their implementation plans (known as state 
implementation plans, or SIPs) to require sale of oxygenated gasoline 
during the period of the year during which the “area is prone to high 
ambient concentrations of carbon monoxide.”80  EPA has the power to 
waive the application of this requirement if a state demonstrates that the 
use of oxygenated gasoline would interfere with the attainment of an 
NAAQS for an air pollutant other than carbon monoxide.81  EPA also 
may waive the requirement that oxygenated gasoline be sold if it 
determines that mobile sources of carbon monoxide do not contribute 
significantly to carbon monoxide levels in a particular area.82 
 OSH Act.  Harm-based, back-end adjustments are not limited to the 
federal pollution control laws.  The Secretary of Labor may issue such 
adjustments under the OSH Act, too.  The OSH Act permits any affected 
employer to apply to the Secretary for a variance from an occupational 
safety and health standard.83  The Secretary must grant the application if 
he or she finds that the employer  
 
has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
conditions, practices, means, methods, operations, or processes used or 
proposed to be used by an employer will provide employment and 
                                                     
 78. Id. § 6924(q)(2)(B). 
 79. The CAA, for example, authorizes EPA to make adjustments to regulatory obligations for 
sources contained within geographic areas based on the absence of a risk to health or the 
environment from regulated sources in that area.  Thus, the statute affords EPA the discretion to 
waive any requirement imposed on certain areas that are not in compliance with the NAAQS for 
particulate matter if it determines that anthropogenic sources of PM-10 do not significantly 
contribute to the violation of the PM-10 standard in that area.  Id. § 7513(f). 
 80. Id. § 7545(m)(2). 
 81. Id. § 7545(m)(3)(A). 
 82. Id. § 7545(m)(3)(B).  EPA also may delay the effective date of the oxygenated fuels 
requirement if it finds that there is or is likely to be an inadequate domestic supply of or distribution 
capacity for oxygenated gasoline in the area.  Id. § 7545(m)(3)(C).  This provision is a form of 
hardship-based adjustment based on technological inadequacy. 
 83. 29 U.S.C. § 655(d) (2000). 
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places of employment to his employees which are as safe and healthful 
as those which would prevail if he complied with the standard.84   
 
The variance must prescribe the conditions the employer must maintain 
and the practices it must adopt to the extent they differ from the standard 
from which the variance is sought.85 
 ESA.  Finally, the ESA also provides for harm-based adjustments.  
The statute authorizes any interested person to file a petition to add a 
species to or remove a species from the lists maintained by the Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) of endangered and threatened species.86  The 
FWS must issue a finding as to whether the petition presents substantial 
scientific or commercial information indicating that the petitioned action 
may be warranted.87  If so, the FWS must commence a review of the 
status of the species concerned.88  If the FWS decides to grant a delisting 
petition, it essentially concludes that the harm or risk to species that the 
ESA is meant to avoid89 does not exist.  Similarly, the ESA authorizes 
interested persons to file petitions to revise critical habitat designations 
previously made by the FWS.90 
 In certain instances, back-end adjustments may be available not 
because the affected activity lacks the potential to harm the resource or 
value that the statute seeks to protect, but instead because the application 
of the regulation from which relief is sought has the potential to harm 
other resources or values.  EPA has authorized the issuance of variances 
under the CWA, for example, to point sources able to demonstrate that 
regulatory compliance “would result in significant adverse impacts on 
local air quality . . . or significant adverse impacts on local energy 
markets.”91  Such an adjustment also qualifies as a harm-based 
adjustment, although the basis for the adjustment is the desire to avoid 
adverse cross-media impacts rather than to avoid treatment for 
treatment’s sake. 
 
b. Evaluation 
                                                     
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (2000). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. The ESA is designed in part “to provide a program for the conservation of . . . endangered 
species and threatened species.”  Id. § 1531(b). 
 90. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(D)(i). 
 91. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 192 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 
125.85(a)(2)). 
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 A regulated entity is entitled to a harm-based adjustment if it can 
establish that the adjustment would not lead to decreased protection for 
people or the environment.  When this situation exists, Congress has 
authorized the agency either to reduce92 or waive93 the regulatory 
requirement.   
 Harm-based adjustments, such as these provisions, rationalize 
regulation because they take into account situations in which the 
regulated entity does not present any danger to the public or the 
environment or presents less danger than other regulated entities.  
Assuming that there is an accurate agency determination regarding the 
risk issue so that the levels of protection chosen by Congress are not 
jeopardized through individualized adjustments, this category of back-
end adjustments would appear to promote the advantages identified 
earlier.  Regulators can eliminate unnecessary costs, but this is done at 
the back-end instead of during rulemaking.  Moreover, regulated entities 
do not have to sue the agency and contest the rulemaking in order to get 
regulatory relief.  Presumably, the administrative adjustment process will 
be less onerous than a judicial challenge would be in many cases. 
 
2. Hardship-Based Adjustments 
 
 The harm-based adjustments discussed above recognize that some 
regulated entities may not be endangering the public or the environment 
in the manner anticipated by a regulation.  Hardship adjustments, by 
comparison, are based on the adverse economic impact of regulation on 
an individual firm or on the absence of available technology to comply 
with regulatory standards.  The rationale for hardship-based adjustments 
is as follows: 
 
Though Congress may have decided that industries should internalize 
certain environmental costs, . . . Congress’s broad legislative objectives 
do not automatically outweigh the continued survival of regulated 
firms.  The regulatory cures for environmental pollution . . . should not 
necessarily cripple the industries to which they apply.  Stability and 
preservation of economic order go hand in hand with environmental or 
economic reforms.  The regulatory preference for individual firm 
survival does not necessarily mean that shutdowns must always be 
                                                     
 92. See supra notes 64–66 (discussing the CWA), 883–85 (discussing the OSH Act). 
 93. See supra notes 69–78 (discussing RCRA), 79–91 (discussing the CAA) and 85–90 
(discussing the ESA). 
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avoided, but such extreme consequences should be the result of a 
considered process, not the unintended or unconscious fallout of an 
overbroad statute or rule.94 
 
a. Availability 
 
 All five statutes also provide for incremental adjustments on the 
basis of hardship.  Our survey found the following examples of such 
adjustments. 
 CWA.  The CWA authorizes EPA to establish technology-based 
effluent limitations as the principal device for achieving95 the statute’s 
fishable/swimmable waters goal.96  To avoid the statutory prohibition on 
discharges into navigable waters,97 point sources of surface water 
pollution must comply with a phased series of effluent limitations, which 
are incorporated into individual permits issued either by EPA or an 
authorized state.  The statute authorizes EPA, however, to “modify”98 the 
requirements of the second phase of the effluent limitations “upon a 
showing by the owner or operator of such point source . . . that such 
modified requirements (1) will represent the maximum use of technology 
within the economic capability of the owner or operator; and (2) will 
result in reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the 
discharge of pollutants.”99  Thus, as the Supreme Court has explained, 
“the economic ability of the individual operator to meet the costs of 
effluent reductions may in some circumstances justify granting a 
variance from the [phase two, technology-based] limitations.”100  This 
kind of hardship-based adjustment “creates for a particular point source a 
[technology-based] standard that represents for it the same sort of 
economic and technological commitment as the general . . . standard 
creates for the class.”101 
                                                     
 94. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative 
Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277, 302–03. 
 95. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2000). 
 96. Id. § 1251(a)(2). 
 97. Id. § 1311(a). 
 98. The Supreme Court has referred to these modifications as variances.  E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 136 (1977). 
 99. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c).  These modifications apply to point sources discharging 
nonconventional pollutants.  See id. § 1311(l) (barring EPA from issuing a modification with respect 
to listed toxic pollutants). 
 100. EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 72 (1980). 
 101. Id. at 74.  In addition to demonstrating economic hardship, the applicant must show that it 
will make “reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the discharge of pollutants.”  33 
U.S.C. § 1311(c).  Accordingly, the economic hardship that compliance with regulatory standards 
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 Further, EPA regulations authorize variances from the category-wide 
effluent limitation regulations on a different basis that relates to the 
economic impact of regulation on a particular discharger.  The 
regulations make variances available to dischargers able to demonstrate 
that compliance with the national limits would result in the imposition of 
a removal cost that is “wholly out of proportion to the removal cost 
considered during development of the national limits.”102 
 RCRA.  RCRA contains an adjustment mechanism based on the 
unavailability of pollution control technology.  RCRA subjects those 
involved in the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste to the 
most rigorous regulatory treatment.  When Congress amended the statute 
in 1984, it adopted a series of bans on the land disposal103 of certain 
kinds of hazardous waste, including wastes containing free cyanides or 
heavy metals, solvents, or dioxins.104  RCRA authorizes EPA to defer the 
effective date of one or more of the land disposal prohibitions based on 
the unavailability of adequate alternative treatment, recovery, or disposal 
capacity, provided it protects human health and the environment.105  If 
EPA grants a deadline extension (which the statute calls a variance), 
hazardous waste may be disposed in a landfill or surface impoundment 
for the duration of the extension period, provided the facility at which the 
                                                                                                                       
for a class of point sources would cause for an individual point source is allowed to undercut the 
statutory goal of reducing water pollution only up to a point. 
The CWA also provided relief to publicly owned treatment works on hardship grounds.  The 
statute allowed the owners or operators of such works to request that EPA or an authorized state 
extend the time for compliance with the technology-based controls applicable to publicly owned 
treatment works (called secondary treatment).  Id. §§ 1311(b)(1)(B), 1314(d).  To be eligible for 
such an extension, the applicant had to show that construction was required for the treatment works 
to achieve secondary treatment but that the United States had failed to make financial assistance 
available to the treatment works in time for it to achieve the discharge limitations based on 
secondary treatment.  Id. § 1311(i).  Requests by municipalities for an extension under this provision 
had to be filed within 180 days of February 4, 1987. 
 102. 40 C.F.R. § 125.31(b)(3)(i) (2003).  This provision is part of the FDF variance mechanism 
discussed more fully below in connection with fairness-based adjustments.  In EPA v. National 
Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980), the Court held that, even though FDF variances were 
available from the phase one, technology-based effluent limitations for point sources, FDF variances 
were not available on the ground that a particular discharger could not afford to comply with the 
national limits.  Id. at 74–78.  See also Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 192 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(citing 40 C.F.R. § 125.85(a)(2) and stating that a variance may be available from cooling water 
intake structure regulations based on “compliance costs wholly out of proportion to the costs EPA 
considered in establishing the requirement” for which the variance is sought).   
 103. For purposes of this prohibition, “land disposal” includes “placement of such hazardous 
waste in a landfill, surface impoundment, waste pile, injection well, land treatment facility, salt 
dome formation, salt bed formation, or underground mine or cave.”  42 U.S.C. § 6924(k) (2000). 
 104. Id. § 6924(d)–(e).  The 1984 amendments also banned the disposal of these wastes into 
deep injection wells, id. § 6924(f), and required EPA to determine whether to ban the land disposal 
of other listed hazardous wastes pursuant to a statutory timetable, id. § 6924(g)(4)–(5). 
 105. Id. § 6924(h)(2). 
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disposal occurs complies with minimum technological requirements 
(such as installation of liners and leachate collection systems and the 
performance of groundwater monitoring) set forth in the statute.106 
 CAA.  The CAA also envisions the issuance of back-end adjustments 
based on economic hardship or technological infeasibility.107  For the 
most part, those adjustments are issued by the states, not by EPA.108  
EPA is responsible under the CAA for issuing NAAQS that are requisite 
to protect the public health and welfare.109  The statute delegates to the 
states the authority to devise SIPs to achieve the NAAQS.110  States still 
have considerable discretion to determine the manner in which they will 
control emissions of air pollutants, provided the mix of controls the state 
devises is sufficient to achieve the NAAQS,111 even though that 
discretion was reduced by both the 1977 and 1990 amendments.112  
States may accommodate concerns that pollution control requirements 
will adversely affect the economic viability of a regulated source in the 
implementation plan itself.113  Alternatively, a regulated air pollution 
source may apply to the state agency that administers the plan for a 
variance from the plan, and such a variance may be based on claims of 
                                                     
 106. Id. § 6924(h)(4). 
 107. In addition to the individualized adjustment mechanisms described below, the CAA 
provides for certain “global adjustments” on feasibility grounds as well.  For example, the statute 
authorizes EPA, upon application by a state, to extend the attainment date for compliance with the 
national ambient air quality standards for particulate matter if the state demonstrates that compliance 
with the statutory deadline “would be impracticable” and that the state has already required the most 
stringent control measures that can be feasibly implemented in the area.  Id. § 7513(e). 
 108. But see 40 C.F.R. §§ 80.560–80.561 (allowing EPA to grant hardship-based relief from 
requirements of diesel sulfur control program). 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b). 
 110. Id. § 7410(a); see also id. § 7407(a) (declaring that each state has the “primary 
responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such State by 
submitting an implementation plan for such State which will specify the manner in which national 
primary and secondary ambient air quality standards will be achieved and maintained . . . in such 
State”). 
 111. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 267 (1976) (“the State has virtually absolute 
power in allocating emission limitations so long as the national standards are met”); Train v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975) (“so long as the ultimate effect of a State’s choice of 
emission limitations is compliance with the national standards for ambient air, the State is at liberty 
to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its particular situation”). 
 112. See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 329 
(4th ed. 2003) (discussing the effect of the 1990 amendments). 
 113. See Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 266.  The Court states: 
Perhaps the most important forum for consideration of claims of economic and 
technological infeasibility is before the state agency formulating the implementation plan.  
So long as the national standards are met, the State may select whatever mix of control 
devices it desires, and industries with particular economic or technological problems may 
seek special treatment in the plan itself. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 20 
economic hardship or technological feasibility.  The Supreme Court has 
stated that, while nothing in the CAA requires the states to grant 
variances based on claims of economic or technological infeasibility, the 
statute delegates the authority to the states to make adjustments to the 
SIP on these grounds.114  After the 1990 amendments to the CAA, the 
states have the authority to accommodate concerns based on economic 
hardship through the issuance of individual permits.115 
 The CAA also authorizes EPA and the states to adjust the obligations 
of a particular class of air pollution sources, primary nonferrous smelters, 
based on technological unavailability.  Either EPA or a state may issue a 
primary nonferrous smelter order, which becomes part of the state 
implementation plan, if an individual smelter is unable to meet the 
implementation plan’s deadline for compliance with a sulfur oxide 
emission standard because no means of emission limitation has been 
adequately determined to be reasonably available.116  The recipient of 
such an order must comply with whatever interim measures EPA 
determines are necessary to assure attainment and maintenance of the 
NAAQS, taking into account all variances, extensions, waivers, and 
primary nonferrous smelter orders previously issued under the CAA.117  
EPA also may establish alternative, less stringent emission limitations for 
coal-fired utilities subject to the nitrogen oxides emission reduction 
program created in 1990 as part of the acid deposition control program if 
the utility can show that it cannot meet the applicable limitation using the 
technology on which EPA based the limitation.118 
 Finally, the CAA provides for adjustments to avoid economic 
hardship upon the initiative of a state governor, rather than at the behest 
of individual regulated entities.  The governor may submit to EPA a 
proposed revision to the state’s implementation plan that meets CAA 
requirements and that is necessary to prevent the closing of any source of 
air pollution and substantial increases in unemployment that would result 
from such a closing.119  If EPA has neither approved nor disapproved the 
                                                     
 114. Id. at 267 n.16 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.2(b), (d) (1975)); see also Train, 421 U.S. at 69 n.6 
(quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 88-912 (1971)) (allowing issuance of variances based on “special 
circumstances which would render strict compliance unreasonable, unduly burdensome, or 
impractical . . . or because strict compliance would result in substantial curtailment or closing down 
of one or more businesses, plants or operations”).  The electric utility that brought suit in Union 
Electric apparently received a variance on economic hardship grounds.  427 U.S. at 252.   
 115. The permit program created by the 1990 amendments is governed by 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661–
7661f (2000). 
 116. Id. § 7419(b)(3). 
 117. Id. § 7419(d)(1)(A). 
 118. Id. § 7651f(d)(2). 
 119. Id. § 7410(g)(1). 
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proposal within twelve months of submission, the governor may issue a 
temporary emergency suspension of the part of the implementation plan 
subject to the proposed revision.120  If the governor finds that the source 
is unable to comply solely because of the conditions upon which the 
suspension was based, the suspension order may include a provision 
delaying any compliance order or increment of progress to which a 
pollution source is subject.121 
 The OSH Act.  Congress has provided for hardship-based 
adjustments from workplace health and safety standards as well as from 
the federal pollution control laws.  The OSH Act authorizes any 
employer to apply to the Secretary of Labor for a temporary order 
granting a variance from an occupational safety and health standard 
promulgated by OSHA.122  To qualify for a variance, the employer must 
establish that it is unable to comply with a standard by its effective date 
because of unavailability of personnel or unavailability of materials and 
equipment or because required construction or alteration of facilities 
cannot be completed by the effective date.123  In addition, the employer 
must show that it is taking all available steps to protect its employees 
against the hazards covered by the standard and that it has an effective 
program for coming into compliance with the standard as soon as 
practicable.124  Any variance issued by the Secretary must prescribe the 
practices the employer must use while the order is in effect.125 
 ESA.  Finally, Congress has authorized the issuance of hardship-
based adjustments to the prohibition on the taking of endangered species 
in the ESA.  If any person enters into a contract regarding a species of 
fish, wildlife, or plant before notice is published in the Federal Register 
listing that species as endangered, and if the subsequent listing of the 
species will cause “undue economic hardship to such person under the 
contract,” then the Secretary of the Interior may exempt the person from 
the taking prohibition “in order to minimize such hardship.”126  The 
statute defines undue economic hardship to include substantial economic 
                                                     
 120. Id.  A suspension may not last more than four months and may be disapproved by EPA if it 
does not meet the requirements for implementation plans under the CAA.  Id. § 7410(g)(2). 
 121. Id. § 7410(g)(3). 
 122. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(6)(A) (2000). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.  Any employer seeking a variance must certify that it has informed employees of the 
application for a variance.  Id. § 655(b)(6)(B)(v). 
 126. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(b)(1).  No exemption may last more than one year from the date of 
publication in the Federal Register of notice of consideration of the species concerned.  Id. 
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loss resulting from inability to perform the contract, substantial economic 
loss to persons who derived a significant portion of their income from the 
lawful procurement of any listed species, or curtailment of subsistence 
taking made unlawful by the ESA.127  The Secretary may only grant a 
hardship exemption upon finding that it was applied for in good faith, it 
will not operate to the disadvantage of the endangered species concerned, 
and it will be consistent with the ESA’s purposes.128 
 
b. Evaluation 
 
 Congress provided for hardship-based adjustments in all five of the 
statutes that we have studied.  A firm is entitled to a hardship-based 
adjustment because of its financial difficulty in meeting its regulatory 
obligations.  Although such hardship does not excuse a regulated entity 
from reducing risks to people or the environment, it may justify a lesser 
regulatory burden.  Thus, unlike a harm-based adjustment, this back-end 
process exposes people or the environment to greater risks than if a firm 
were required to comply with the existing regulatory requirement.  These 
provisions reflect one of the ways that Congress takes into account 
regulatory costs without relying on a cost-benefit test to establish the 
level of regulation.129   
 Congress has sought to balance cost concerns with regulatory 
protection in various ways.  The CWA permits EPA to modify some 
regulatory requirements applicable to point sources if those requirements 
are not “within the economic capability” of a regulated entity, but the 
revised requirement must “result in reasonable further progress toward 
the elimination of the discharge of pollutants.”130  RCRA permits EPA to 
defer compliance with land disposal prohibitions based on the 
unavailability of necessary technology or disposal capacity.131  The CAA 
permits states to issue variances from implementation plan requirements 
that accommodate economic concerns, but after these adjustments, the 
state must still come into compliance with national air quality 
                                                     
 127. Id. § 1539(b)(2).  “The Secretary may make further requirements for a showing of undue 
economic hardship as he deems fit.”  Id. § 1539(b)(3). 
 128. Id. § 1539(d).  These limitations also apply to the technology-improving exemption for 
experimental populations described below.  See infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which costs are 
taken into account in regulatory statutes).  See also supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.  
 130. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c); supra note 99 and accompanying text.  
 131. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.  
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standards.132  OSHA is permitted to grant variances from occupational 
safety and health standards based on the unavailability of personnel or 
materials, but only if the employer commits to taking all necessary steps 
to safeguard employees against the relevant workplace hazards.133 The 
ESA authorizes exemptions from the taking prohibition based on “undue 
economic hardship,” but only if the exemption will not operate to the 
disadvantage of the species concerned and will be consistent with 
statutory purposes.134  
 As a general proposition, we think that regulated entities should 
qualify for hardship-based adjustments when regulations will produce 
excessive regulatory costs, but only if the public and the environment are 
still substantially protected.  We understand that regulation can increase 
the cost of business for firms, and sometimes substantially so, but 
existing statutes commit the country to a precautionary tilt in favor of 
protecting people and the environment.135  That tilt is reflected in the 
willingness of Congress to force some plants unable to comply with their 
regulatory obligations to shut down.136  As one court noted in connection 
with the CWA, “Congress clearly contemplated that cleaning up the 
nation’s waters might necessitate the closing of some marginal plants.”137  
A back-end process that granted regulatory relief without a 
demonstration of significant economic dislocation would be inconsistent 
with this approach.   So would a regulatory system that fails to obtain 
significant protection for the public in order to account for excessive 
costs.  While some adjustment may be necessary because of high costs, 
the public and the environment should still be substantially protected.   
 On their face, the previous provisions appear to meet these 
objectives.  The devil, of course, is in the details.  The way in which 
regulators interpret these provisions can have a significant impact on 
                                                     
 132. See supra notes 108-15and accompanying text; 42 U.S.C. § 7410(l) (prohibiting EPA from 
approving revision to an SIP “if the revision would interfere with any applicable requirement 
concerning attainment and reasonable further progress”). 
 133. See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.  
 134. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.  
 135. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 31. 
 136. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing the 
CWA). 
 137. Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1052 (3d Cir. 1975); cf. Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 491 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 
32,901–02 (1970), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 
1970, at 227 (1974), and indicating that Senator Muskie, the principal sponsor of the CAA, 
construed the statute as seeking to protect the public health, “even if that means that ‘industries will 
be asked to do what seems to be impossible at the present time’”). 
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how easily regulated entities qualify for an adjustment and how much 
protection people and the environment actually receive.  Because of the 
frequent clash between the goals of regulatory statutes and the economic 
self-interest of regulated entities, this category of back-end adjustments 
is troublesome.  Certainly, hardship-based adjustments have greater 
potential to frustrate the goals of the statutes that authorize them than 
either the harm-based adjustments considered above (which are based on 
the absence of the harm sought to be avoided) or the technology-
improvement adjustments considered below (which are based on the 
hope that potential long-term future risk reductions will more than offset 
short-term increases in risk).  We hesitate to endorse a system that 
precludes all hardship-based adjustments for fear that such a system will 
produce economic impacts that society deems unacceptable,138 thereby 
reducing public support for and the legitimacy of the regulatory program.  
At the same time, readily available hardship-based adjustments can 
easily undercut the ability of a regulatory program to achieve its 
protective goals.  For this reason, the need to ensure that regulators are 
accountable in their resolution of requests for hardship-based 
adjustments is particularly important.  The system of accountability 
provided by statute must be capable of ensuring that back-end 
adjustments, either individually or cumulatively, do not result in levels of 
risk or harm antithetical to the regulatory programs designed to control 
them.  We consider the accountability of states and agencies when they 
grant these adjustments below. 
Having recognized that adjustments based on economic harm or 
technological unavailability are probably inevitable, we nevertheless 
reach the conclusion that such adjustments are inappropriate if the 
regulatory requirement from which relief is sought is in the nature of a 
technology-forcing mandate.  A technology-forcing requirement is one 
that is “expressly designed to force regulated sources to develop 
pollution control devices [or other control mechanisms] that might at the 
time appear to be economically or technologically infeasible.”139  
Hardship-based adjustments to technology-forcing standards are 
inappropriate because these adjustments frustrate the objective of 
pushing regulated firms that are economically or technologically 
                                                     
 138. But see supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text (discussing legislative intent that 
economically marginal firms shut down if unable to comply with CWA regulations). 
 139. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976).  See also Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
Reilly, 983 F.2d 259, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (describing technology-forcing, or absolute, standards as 
those that “require compliance with statutorily prescribed standards and time tables, irrespective of 
present technologies.  Absolute standards presume that industry can be driven to develop the 
requisite technologies.”). 
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incapable of compliance with current technology to develop new 
technology that is capable of doing the job.   
 
3. Technology-Improvement Adjustments 
 
 Congress has afforded relief to regulated entities under the five 
statutes we surveyed using a third kind of back-end adjustment, namely 
the technology-improvement adjustment.  Such an adjustment grants 
time extensions for regulatory obligations as an incentive for those 
entities to engage in research to develop innovative technologies that will 
help achieve health, safety, and environmental protection objectives 
more effectively or more efficiently.   
 
a. Availability 
 
 All of the statutes except RCRA contain examples of this type of 
adjustment.  Our survey revealed the following illustrations of 
technology-improvement adjustments. 
 CWA.  The CWA offers back-end adjustments in the form of 
deadline extensions based on an effort to induce the development of new 
technology by regulated entities.  The statute provides that EPA or an 
authorized state may extend the deadline for compliance with the second 
phase of the technology-based effluent limitations by as much as two 
years.140  To qualify for such a deadline extension, the applicant must 
show that it proposes to comply with the applicable effluent limitations 
by “replacing existing production capacity with an innovative production 
process which will result in an effluent reduction significantly greater 
than required by the limitation otherwise applicable to such facility” or 
with an innovative control technique that has a substantial likelihood for 
achieving such an effluent reduction.141  Alternatively, the applicant can 
qualify for a deadline extension if it demonstrates that it will use an 
innovative system that has the potential for significantly lower costs than 
the systems that EPA has determined to be economically achievable for 
that kind of facility.142  A technology-forcing deadline extension under 
the CWA is available only if EPA or the state determines that the 
innovative technology has the potential for industry-wide application.143  
                                                     
 140. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(k) (2000). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
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Congress apparently was willing to allow higher levels of pollution over 
the short run at a particular point source if that point source committed to 
developing innovative technology that had the potential for achieving 
more effective or more efficient pollution control on an industry-wide 
basis in the long run.  The CWA provides a similar compliance deadline 
extension for indirect dischargers proposing to comply with pretreatment 
requirements through the use of innovative systems.144 
 CAA.  The CAA contains a similar technology-improvement 
adjustment mechanism that applies to new stationary sources of air 
pollution.145  Any person proposing to own or operate a new source may 
request that EPA issue a waiver from federal standards of performance 
“to encourage the use of an innovative technological system of 
continuous emission reduction.”146  EPA may issue such a waiver if it 
finds that the proposed system has not been adequately demonstrated, the 
proposed system will operate effectively and there is a substantial 
likelihood that it will achieve greater continuous emission reduction than 
required under the standard or achieve at least an equivalent reduction at 
lower cost, and the source shows that the “proposed system will not 
cause or contribute to an unreasonable risk to public health, welfare, or 
safety in its operation.”147  No waiver may be issued if it would prevent 
attainment or maintenance of the NAAQS,148 and the number of waivers 
issued with respect to a proposed system of emission reduction may not 
exceed the number EPA deems necessary to ascertain whether or not the 
system will achieve the desired results without creating unreasonable 
risks to health, welfare, or safety.149 
 Another technology-improvement adjustment created by the CAA 
relates to compliance with emission standards applicable to stationary 
sources of hazardous air pollutants.  EPA or a state with an EPA-
approved permit program may issue a permit allowing an existing source 
to meet an alternative emission limitation if the source demonstrates that 
it has achieved a reduction of 90 percent or more in emissions for six 
years from the date the regulatory standard would otherwise have 
                                                     
 144. Id. § 1317(e).  The extension is available only if EPA or the state determines that issuance 
of the extension will not cause a publicly owned treatment works to violate its permit or applicable 
sewage sludge disposal requirements.  Id. § 1317(e)(2)(A). 
 145. A “new source” for these purposes is one upon which “construction or modification 
commenced after the publication of regulations (or . . . proposed regulations) prescribing a standard 
of performance” for the relevant category of sources.  42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (2000). 
 146. Id. § 7411(j)(1)(A). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. § 7411(j)(1)(B)(i). 
 149. Id. § 7411(j)(1)(C). 
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applied, provided the source achieved that reduction before the standard 
was first proposed.150  The apparent purpose of this provision was to 
provide incentives for sources of hazardous air pollutants to begin 
reducing their emissions even before they were required to do so in 
exchange for the promise of relatively lenient emission controls when 
standards for its category of source were eventually promulgated. 
 The CAA also authorizes EPA to waive the provisions of emission 
standards for motor vehicle engines to encourage the development of 
better pollution control technology.  EPA may issue a waiver of the 
standard for emissions of oxides of nitrogen from light-duty engines and 
vehicles upon the petition of a motor vehicle manufacturer if the 
manufacturer demonstrates that a “waiver is necessary to permit the use 
of an innovative power train technology, or innovative emission control 
device or system.”151  The waiver is available only if it would not 
endanger public health, there is a substantial likelihood that compliance 
will be possible when the waiver expires, and the technology has a 
“potential for long-term air quality benefit and has the potential to meet 
or exceed the average fuel economy standard.”152 
 Even the market-based acid deposition control provisions allow for 
adjustments as a means of improving pollution control performance.  The 
1990 amendments to the CAA provided for the allocation of 
“allowances” to regulated sources of sulfur dioxide emissions.153  The 
statute prohibits any source from emitting sulfur dioxide in excess of its 
allowances.154  Allowances may be bought and sold155 so that a source 
able to limit its sulfur dioxide emissions to amounts lower than the 
allowances it holds may sell its excess allowances either to another 
source unable to comply with the emissions cap represented by its 
allocation of allowances or to a public interest group that wants to retire 
allowances from the system.  The statute allows a regulated source to 
propose in its permit application to reassign its sulfur dioxide reduction 
requirements to any other unit under the control of the same owner or 
operator.156  EPA may approve the reassignment if it concludes that the 
                                                     
 150. Id. § 7412(i)(5)(A). 
 151. Id. § 7521(b)(3). 
 152. Id.  No waiver “shall apply to more than 5 percent of such manufacturer’s production or 
more than fifty thousand vehicles or engines, whichever is greater.”  Id. 
 153. Id. § 7651b(a)(1). 
 154. Id. § 7651c(a)(1).  Each allowance constitutes authorization for its holder to emit one ton of 
sulfur dioxide during a calendar year.  Id. § 7651a(3). 
 155. Id. § 7651b(b). 
 156. Id. 
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reassigned tonnage limits will “achieve the same or greater emissions 
reduction than would have been achieved” by the transferring source if 
not for the reassignment.157  Regulated sources also may petition EPA for 
extensions of the deadlines for meeting emission limitation requirements 
under the acid deposition control program based on the use of certain 
technologies.158 
 OSH Act.  The Secretary of Labor has broad authority to issue 
technology-improvement adjustments from occupational safety and 
health standards under the OSH Act.  The Secretary may grant a variance 
from any such standard whenever he or she determines, or the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services certifies, that a variance is necessary to 
permit an employer to participate in an experiment approved by one of 
the two Secretaries that is “designed to demonstrate or validate new and 
improved techniques to safeguard the health or safety of workers.”159  
The statute contains no limitations on the number of variances the 
Secretary may issue or on the duration of any variances issued. 
 ESA.  The ESA also contains a provision authorizing what might be 
regarded as analogous to a technology-improvement adjustment.  The 
Secretary of the Interior may permit any act that would otherwise qualify 
as a prohibited taking if it is for “scientific purposes or to enhance the 
propagation or survival of the affected species, including acts necessary 
for the establishment and maintenance of experimental populations.”160  
As Holly Doremus has explained, “[g]iving landowners permission 
knowingly or deliberately to take introduced animals in the course of 
agricultural or other activities on the property will encourage them to 
host reintroductions.  Provided the introduced population can absorb the 
authorized take, such regulations would further the conservation of the 
species.”161 
 
b. Evaluation 
 
 When an agency grants a hardship adjustment, it permits a regulated 
entity to engage in less protection of people and the environment in light 
of the excessive costs involved in meeting the level of mandated 
regulation.  A technology-improvement adjustment has another 
                                                     
 157. Id. § 7651c(b)(5). 
 158. Id. § 7651c(d)(1). 
 159. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(6)(C). 
 160. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A).  For discussion of the ESA’s treatment of experimental 
populations, see generally Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The Importance of Being 
Wild, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
 161. Doremus, supra note 160, at 30. 
2004] IMPROVING REGULATION   
 
29
objective.  Under this approach, an agency can grant relief from a 
regulatory mandate if an adjustment is likely to produce either the 
intended level of protection at lower cost or more environmental 
protection than required by an existing mandate.   
 This kind of adjustment has the potential to improve regulatory 
policy because Congress has been reasonably specific in demanding that 
there be some advantage in making a technology-improvement 
adjustment.  EPA can grant deadline extensions from technology-based 
effluent limitations under the CWA but only if an existing point source is 
committed to developing innovative technology that has the potential to 
achieve more efficient or more effective pollution control on an 
industrywide basis in the long run.162  Under the CAA, new stationary 
sources163 and stationary sources of hazardous air pollutants164 can obtain 
waivers from the obligation to comply with existing abatement 
obligations if they propose to use innovative technologies, but only if 
there is evidence that the alternative would produce about the same level 
of protection.  A similar waiver concerning emissions standards for 
motor vehicle emissions is likewise conditioned on evidence that the 
public health would not be endangered and the new technology is likely 
to be an improvement over existing technologies.165  EPA can also make 
adjustments in the market-based acid rain deposition control provisions, 
but only if the adjustment will result in the same or greater emissions 
reductions than would have been achieved without the adjustment.166  
 Congress has made similar provisions in the other statutes.  OSHA 
can grant a variance if it is necessary to participate in an experiment to 
improve worker safety and health.167  The Secretary of Interior may 
permit actions that otherwise would violate the taking prohibition of the 
ESA for scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of 
a species.168  
 The fact that an agency’s power to make an adjustment is 
conditioned on ensuring that the public and the environment receive a 
similar level or greater level of protection (at least in the long run) makes 
this category of adjustments similar to harm-based adjustments.  These 
provisions rationalize regulation because they permit agencies to obtain a 
                                                     
 162. See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text.  
 163. See supra notes 145–49 and accompanying text.  
 164. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.  
 165. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.  
 166. See supra notes 153–58 and accompanying text.  
 167. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.  
 168. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.  
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similar or enhanced level of protection through the production of more 
efficient or more effective abatement technologies.  Assuming that there 
is an accurate agency determination regarding the degree to which the 
public is protected and the potential for an improved technology, this 
provision aids innovation and cost reduction.   
 
4. Fairness-Based Adjustments 
 
 The previous adjustments addressed instances where a regulated 
entity does not present the same level of risk a regulation addresses, 
where compliance with a regulation presents an economic hardship, or 
where the agency is willing to allow more time for regulatory 
compliance in exchange for extracting a commitment from industry to 
engage in technology-improving research and development.  A fourth 
ground upon which regulatory relief may be available for individual 
regulated entities is fairness.  A fairness-based adjustment addresses 
factors that affect compliance other than the risks created by a regulated 
entity, the cost of compliance, or the desire to provide technology-
improving incentives. 
 
a. Availability 
 
 Our survey revealed two examples of fairness-based adjustments.  
Congress has provided for such adjustments under the CWA and RCRA. 
 CWA.  As enacted in 1972, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(now known as the CWA) did not provide for adjustments of 
industrywide effluent limitations for individual point sources on fairness 
grounds.  EPA developed by regulation, however, a mechanism called a 
“fundamentally different factor” or FDF variance, pursuant to which 
applicable effluent limitations could be made either more or less 
stringent to the extent that “factors relating to the equipment or facilities 
involved, the process applied, or other such factors related to such 
discharger are fundamentally different from the factors considered” by 
EPA in issuing the effluent limitations for the category or class of point 
sources involved.169  The Supreme Court held in an early CWA case that 
EPA’s authority to issue effluent limitations by regulation for classes or 
                                                     
 169. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 122–23 & n.10 (1977) (quoting 40 
C.F.R. §§ 415.72, 415.222 (1976)). 
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categories of point sources was contingent on the availability of 
variances for individual plants.170 
 Congress codified the FDF variance mechanism when it adopted the 
1987 amendments to the CWA.  The statute now provides that EPA, with 
the concurrence of the state, may establish an alternative effluent 
limitation that modifies those requirements of the classwide effluent 
limitation regulations that would otherwise apply to an individual point 
source171 if the individual facility applying for the alternative 
requirement demonstrates that “the facility is fundamentally different 
with respect to the factors (other than cost)” which EPA considered in 
establishing the classwide effluent limitation regulations.172  The statute 
further specifies that “the alternative requirement may be no less 
stringent than is justified by the fundamental difference” and that it must 
not “result in a nonwater quality environmental impact which is 
markedly more adverse than the impact” EPA considered in establishing 
the classwide regulations.173  The premise behind the FDF variance 
mechanism is that if EPA had known about the unique (fundamentally 
different) situation of the individual point source when it issued the 
effluent limitation regulations for the industry involved, it would have 
concluded that the point source merited differential treatment based on 
its unique situation.174  That differential treatment could have been 
                                                     
 170. Id. at 128.  The Court later held that EPA did not have to make FDF variances from the 
phase one effluent limitations available on the basis of the economic capability of an individual point 
source to afford the costs of the classwide effluent limitation regulations.  EPA v. Nat’l Crushed 
Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 73–78 (1980).  Thus, the FDF variance developed by EPA was not a 
hardship-based adjustment mechanism.  A greater than normal cost of compliance, however, could 
provide the basis for a variance.  Id. at 68 n.5 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 50,042 (1978)). 
 171. These FDF variances are also available to indirect dischargers subject to categorical 
pretreatment standards on the same grounds.  33 U.S.C. § 1311(n)(1).  Indirect dischargers are 
facilities that send their waste for treatment at a publicly owned treatment works instead of 
discharging it directly into waters of the United States. 
 172. Id. § 1311(n)(1)(A). 
 173. Id. § 1311(n)(1)(C), (D).  The statute requires that the application be based solely on 
information submitted to EPA during the rulemaking for establishment of the classwide regulations 
specifically raising the factors that are fundamentally different for the applicant or on information 
the applicant did not have a reasonable opportunity to submit during the rulemaking.  Id. § 
1311(n)(1)(B).  Thus, the fundamentally different factor must be one that EPA ignored during the 
rulemaking or that EPA did not have the opportunity to consider at the time of the rulemaking. 
 174. EPA’s regulations explain that data which could affect the nationally applicable effluent 
limitations may not be available or may not be considered during the development of the limitations. 
As a result, it may be necessary on a case-by-case basis to adjust the national limits, and 
make them either more or less stringent as they apply to certain dischargers within an 
industrial category or subcategory.  This will only be done if data specific to that 
discharger indicate it presents factors fundamentally different from those considered by 
EPA in developing the limit at issue. 
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accommodated by creating a separate class for the point source involved.  
The issuance of an FDF variance “simply represents an alternative 
procedural mechanism for accomplishing the same result—essentially, 
promulgation of a rule applicable to a category of one entity.”175 
 RCRA.  RCRA also authorizes what appears to be a fairness-based 
variance that is analogous to the CWA’s FDF variance.  In addition to 
authorizing EPA to extend the deadline for compliance with one of the 
statute’s land disposal prohibitions for a category of facilities, RCRA 
allows EPA to issue extensions of the deadlines for complying with the 
same prohibitions on a case-by-case basis.  The applicant for such an 
extension (which the statute refers to as a variance) must demonstrate 
that there is a binding contractual commitment to construct or otherwise 
provide alternative treatment, storage, or disposal capacity but that, due 
to circumstances beyond the control of the applicant, that capacity cannot 
reasonably be made available by the deadline.176  We characterize this as 
a fairness-based adjustment because it appears to be based on the 
presence of unique circumstances that render a particular treatment, 
storage, or disposal facility unable to comply with a land disposal 
prohibition, even though the rest of the industry can.  In light of those 
unique circumstances, it is fair to provide individualized relief to the 
affected regulated entity. 
 
b. Evaluation 
 
 Fairness-based adjustments are made when a regulatory requirement 
is not a rational policy choice because of the unique situation of the 
regulated entity.  The entity presents the same risk as other firms, and 
thus it is not entitled to a harm-based exemption.  The entity is not 
claiming excessive cost, and thus it is not entitled to a hardship 
exemption.177  Rather, it is entitled to a variance because it is in a 
fundamentally different situation than other firms that create the same 
type of risks, and it is therefore inequitable to treat it in the same manner 
                                                                                                                       
40 C.F.R. § 125.30(b) (2003). 
 175. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 130–31 (1985)).  
Under EPA regulations, however, the FDF variance is issued in the context of informal adjudication 
rather than informal rulemaking.  See infra notes 245–51 and accompanying text. 
 176. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(h)(3).  The extension is limited to one year, renewable for one additional 
year.  Id. 
 177. See, e.g., EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980) (upholding EPA’s refusal 
to issue FDF variances to point sources regulated under the CWA on the basis of economic inability 
to comply with regulatory obligations). 
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as the regulations treat more typically situated firms.178  For example, a 
factory in Alaska may not be able to employ the same pollution reduction 
technology as other firms because of the extreme cold in many months of 
the year.  Had the agency known about this situation at the time it had 
written its regulation, it could have written a different regulation for 
firms in this situation.179 
 Although Congress has permitted adjustments on this basis under the 
CWA, it has also required that any alternative requirement be no less 
stringent than is justified by the regulated firm’s unique situation.180  The 
CWA’s FDF variance provision also requires the applicant for a variance 
to demonstrate that the relief it seeks will not result in a 
disproportionately adverse non-water quality impact.181  By limiting the 
level of relief provided by the variance to the amount justified by the 
fundamentally different factor, the statute provides some safeguards 
against the creation of increased environmental risk.  In a sense, this 
restriction represents an attempt to ensure that the recipient of a variance 
“do the most it can” to protect the environment, in light of its unique 
situation.  EPA’s regulations include an additional requirement that a 
variance recipient maintain pre-existing regulatory requirements.182  We 
would be more comfortable with a statutory fairness-based adjustment 
that not only restricts relief to the level justified by the unique situation 
involved but also insists upon maintenance of some minimum level of 
health, safety, or environmental protection. 
 Congress has built similar protective safeguards into the provision of 
RCRA that arguably qualifies as a fairness-based adjustment.183  EPA 
may issue individualized relief from RCRA’s land disposal prohibitions 
based on the unavailability of alternative treatment, storage, or disposal 
capacity only if the affected hazardous waste is disposed in a facility that 
complies with minimum technological requirements, such as liners and 
groundwater monitoring.184 
 
5. Policy Conflict-Based Adjustments 
 
                                                     
 178. See supra notes 172-74and accompanying text.  
 179. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.  
 180. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.  
 181. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(n)(1)(D). 
 182. 40 C.F.R. § 125.31(b)(2) (2003). 
 183. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 184. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(h)(4), (o). 
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 All of the previous adjustments focus on policy factors related to the 
statute being enforced by an agency.  Congress has sometimes provided 
for the modification of regulatory requirements when compliance with 
those requirements would conflict with other policy objectives that 
Congress has deemed important.   
 
a. Availability 
 
 Our survey found a number of policy factors that Congress uses to 
make conflict-based adjustments.  Agencies are authorized to make 
adjustments in light of small business status, nationality security, energy 
policy, and other factors.  With one moribund exception, however, 
Congress has not authorized adjustments to promote economic 
efficiency. 
 Small Businesses.  Congress often has accommodated important 
social values by affording preferential treatment to small business 
entities.  As Professor Richard Pierce has explained, “[t]he belief that 
small is good and big is bad is deeply rooted in our culture and has 
affected the contours of the United States legal system significantly since 
the nation’s founding.”185  The government’s decision to promote the 
values associated with small business enterprise is reflected in the fact 
that “[e]very regulatory system includes a variety of features that confer 
favorable treatment on small firms.”186 
 One example of this pattern of relatively lenient treatment for small 
businesses arises under RCRA.  RCRA required that EPA promulgate 
standards by 1986 for regulation of hazardous waste that is generated in 
small quantities.187  These standards, which were to include standards 
relating to the legitimate use, reuse, recycling, and reclamation of such 
wastes, could vary from the standards applicable to hazardous waste 
generated by large quantity generators but had to be sufficient to protect 
human health and the environment.188  EPA regulations under the CAA 
provide for economic hardship extensions for small refiners of the 
deadlines for complying with requirements for sulfur in gasoline.189 
                                                     
 185. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory 
Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 538 (1998). 
 186. Id. at 539.  According to Pierce, EPA alone has nearly fifty regulations in which the scope 
or stringency of the regulation varies with firm size or amount of pollution emitted.  Id. at 542 n.25 
(citing CHARLES BROWN ET AL., EMPLOYERS LARGE AND SMALL 82–83 (1990)). 
 187. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d)(1). 
 188. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d)(2). 
 189. 40 C.F.R. §§ 80.225–80.270 (2003).  See also id. §§ 80.550–80.553 (listing similar deadline 
extensions from requirements of diesel fuel sulfur control program). 
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  National Security.  A common ground for issuance of back-end 
adjustments is the potential for health, safety, or environmental 
regulation to conflict with the national security interests of the United 
States.190  Many federal pollution control statutes require that federally 
owned facilities comply with regulatory requirements to the same extent 
as nongovernmental entities engaged in the same activity.  The statutes 
also authorize exemptions, however, to protect national security.  The 
CWA, for example, authorizes the President to exempt any effluent 
source operated by a federal agency from compliance with water 
pollution requirements “if he determines it to be in the paramount 
interest of the United States to do so.”191  In addition, the President may 
exempt from regulation any weaponry, equipment, aircraft, vessels, 
vehicles, and other property (and access to property) owned or operated 
by the armed forces on the same grounds.192  The President has similar 
authority to provide exemptions from the obligations of federal facilities 
to comply with regulatory requirements on national security grounds 
under RCRA193 and the CAA.194  The CAA also empowers the President 
to issue exemptions on national security grounds from national emission 
standards for hazardous air pollutants195 and from the prohibition on 
production and use of ozone-depleting chemicals.196  The OSH Act 
authorizes the Secretary of Labor to issue “reasonable variations, 
tolerances, and exemptions” from any statutory requirements “as he may 
find necessary and proper to avoid serious impairment of the national 
defense.”197  Finally, the ESA allows the Endangered Species Committee 
to grant an exemption from the no jeopardy prohibition for any agency 
                                                     
 190. “Historically, the call of military necessity has been in direct conflict with the goal of 
environmental protection.  National security and environmental regulation were seen as an either/or 
proposition, with the environment uniformly sacrificed in the name of national defense.”  Joshua E. 
Latham, The Military Munitions Rule and Environmental Regulation of Munitions, 27 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 467, 469 (2000). 
 191. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a). 
 192. Id. § 1323(a). 
 193. 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (authorizing the President to exempt any federal solid waste 
management facility if it is in the paramount interest of the United States). 
 194. Id. § 7418(b).  The CAA exemption authority also applies to weaponry, equipment, aircraft, 
vehicles, or other classes of property owned or operated by the armed forces or by the National 
Guard of any state and which are “uniquely military in nature.”  Id. 
 195. Id. § 7412(i)(4). 
 196. Id. § 7671c(f).  EPA must determine that adequate substitutes are not available.  Id. 
 197. 29 U.S.C. § 665. 
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action if the Secretary of Defense finds that it is necessary for reasons of 
national security.198 
 Energy Policy.  The CAA provides a back-end adjustment based on 
the potential conflict between national environmental and energy policy 
objectives.  Upon application by the owner or operator of a fuel burning 
stationary source, the governor of the state in which the source is located 
may petition the President to determine that an energy emergency exists 
justifying a temporary suspension of part of an applicable state 
implementation plan, provided there are no other adequate means of 
responding to the energy emergency.199  If the President determines that 
an emergency exists, the governor may issue a temporary suspension of 
the plan.  The governor may issue a suspension to a source only if the 
governor finds that a temporary energy emergency exists in the vicinity 
of the source involving high levels of unemployment or loss of necessary 
energy supplies for residences and that the unemployment or loss of 
supplies can be alleviated by the suspension.200  A suspension may 
authorize a delay in any compliance schedule or increment of progress to 
which the source is subject.201  EPA also has provided for the issuance of 
back-end adjustments by regulation in situations where regulatory 
compliance would adversely affect national energy policy.202 
 Other Objectives.  Back-end adjustments serve to accommodate a 
variety of other policy concerns.  The CAA provides a host of exceptions 
from the phase-out of production and consumption of substances with the 
potential to deplete the stratospheric ozone layer based on the need to 
promote policy goals other than protection of air quality.  EPA has the 
power to authorize the production of chemical substances otherwise 
scheduled to be phased out if the substances are used for “essential 
applications” (such as testing for metal fatigue and corrosion in airplane 
engines and parts),203 are used in medical devices,204 are necessary for 
aviation safety purposes,205 are necessary to comply with sanitation or 
                                                     
 198. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(iii).  The no jeopardy prohibition is described below at notes 
209–11 and accompanying text. 
 199. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(1)(A)–(B).  The President may not delegate this authority to anyone 
else.  Id. 
 200. Id. § 7410(f)(2)(A)–(B). 
 201. Id. § 7410(f)(5). 
 202. See, e.g., Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 192 (2d Cir. 2004) (providing for 
variances from cooling water intake structure requirements under the CWA if compliance would 
result in “significant adverse impacts on local energy markets”) (40 C.F.R. § 125.85(a)(2) (2003)). 
 203. 42 U.S.C. § 7671c(d)(1). 
 204. Id. § 7671c(d)(2); see also id. § 7671d(d)(1) (allowing use of methyl chloroform in medical 
devices pursuant to subsection (d)(2)). 
 205. Id. § 7671c(d)(3). 
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food protection,206 or are used for purposes of fire suppression or 
explosion prevention.207  EPA also may authorize the production of 
ozone-depleting substances for export to developing countries.208 
 Policy conflicts also provide the basis for back-end adjustments 
under the ESA.  The ESA mandates that federal agencies insure that their 
actions are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any 
endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or 
adverse modification of habitat of such species.”209  A federal agency, a 
governor, or an applicant for a federal permit or license, however, may 
apply to the Endangered Species Committee for an exemption from this 
“no jeopardy” prohibition.210  The Committee may grant an exemption if 
it determines that  
 
(i) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the proposed 
agency action; (ii) the benefits of [the] action clearly outweigh the 
benefits of alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the 
species or its critical habitat, and [the] action is in the public interest; 
(iii) the action is of regional or national significance; and (iv) neither 
the Federal agency concerned nor the exemption applicant made any 
irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources [to the proposed 
action].211   
 
The exemption also must establish reasonable mitigation and 
enhancement measures as are necessary to minimize the adverse effects 
of the agency action upon the listed species and its critical habitat.212  
The second factor listed above justifies characterizing this exemption as 
a policy conflict-based adjustment.  The benefits of the action that 
qualify it for an exemption are presumably economic or social benefits of 
some kind, and the action must be in the public interest despite its 
adverse impacts on listed species. 
 Similarly, the ESA provides for policy conflict-based adjustments to 
the statutory prohibition on the taking of endangered species.213  The 
statute authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to issue a permit for any 
                                                     
 206. Id. § 7671c(d)(5). 
 207. Id. § 7671c(g)(1). 
 208. Id. § 7671c(e)(1). 
 209. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
 210. Id. § 1536(g)(1). 
 211. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A). 
 212. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(B). 
 213. See id. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (prohibiting any person from taking any endangered species of fish 
or wildlife located “within the United States or the territorial sea[s] of the United States”). 
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taking that “is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an 
otherwise lawful activity.”214  To qualify for an incidental take permit, an 
applicant must submit to the agency a habitat conservation plan (HCP) 
that specifies the impact that will likely result from the taking, the steps 
the applicant will take to diminish those impacts, and the alternative 
actions the applicant considered and the reasons why they were not 
pursued.215  The Secretary must issue the incidental take permit if he or 
she finds that the taking will be incidental, the applicant will take 
practicable steps to diminish the impacts of the taking, the applicant will 
make sure adequate funding for the HCP will be provided, and the taking 
will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of 
the species in the wild.216  The permit must contain whatever terms and 
conditions the Secretary deems necessary or appropriate, including 
reporting requirements.217  Although the statute does not specify what 
policies might override the desire to protect endangered species, we 
characterized this mechanism as a policy conflict-based adjustment 
because the strict application of the taking prohibition is subordinated to 
an activity designed to serve some other legitimate purpose that has the 
incidental effect of causing the taking of an endangered species.  The 
requirements that the applicant minimize and mitigate adverse impacts 
on listed species and demonstrate that the taking will not appreciably 
reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species provide 
protection against harm to species despite issuance of the permit.218 
 Other ESA adjustments clearly qualify as policy conflict-based 
adjustments.  The President has the authority under the ESA to issue an 
exemption from the no jeopardy prohibition for projects for the repair or 
replacement of public facilities adversely affected by natural disasters.219  
In addition, the statute specifies that the taking prohibition generally does 
not apply to the taking of any endangered or threatened species by 
Alaskan natives if the taking is for subsistence purposes.220  No taking 
for subsistence purposes may be accomplished in a wasteful manner.221 
                                                     
 214. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B). 
 215. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A). 
 216. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(i)–(iv). 
 217. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(v). 
 218. The ESA contains a similar exemption from the taking prohibition for agency actions for 
which the FWS has issued an incidental take statement.  Id. § 1536(o)(2). 
 219. Id. § 1536(p).  EPA may grant exemptions on similar grounds from the gasoline toxics 
provisions.  40 C.F.R. § 80.995 (2003). 
 220. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e)(1). 
 221. Id. § 1539(e)(2). 
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 Economic Efficiency.  Economic efficiency may conflict with health, 
safety, or environmental regulation.  If the costs of complying with a 
regulation exceed the benefits that society derives from the regulation, 
compliance with the regulation generates economic inefficiency because 
the regulation yields a net decline in social welfare.  Just as Congress 
rarely has authorized agencies to promulgate health, safety, or 
environmental regulation pursuant to a cost-benefit test,222 it rarely has 
authorized agencies to provide relief on cost-benefit grounds from 
regulations promulgated pursuant to some other substantive criterion.  
One statute in which it has done so is the CWA, which authorizes EPA, 
with the concurrence of the state, to issue a permit that modifies effluent 
limitations on the ground that there is no reasonable relationship between 
the economic and social costs and the benefits to be obtained from 
compliance.223  EPA has never implemented this provision, however, and 
it has been characterized as a “dead letter.”224  The bill that became the 
CWA originally included a provision that would have authorized the 
issuance of variances to modified new point sources on cost-benefit 
grounds, but the provision was deleted in conference and was never 
adopted.225 
 
b. Evaluation 
 
 The previous provisions all involve environmental policy objectives 
and considerations of implementation costs and technologies.  This 
category of adjustments permits EPA to take into account other policy 
considerations, including the promotion of small business,226 national 
security,227 energy policy,228 and other policies.229 
                                                     
 222. See SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN,  supra note 2, at 32. 
 223. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2)(A). 
 224. Michael P. Healy, Still Dirty After Twenty-Five Years: Water Quality Standard 
Enforcement and the Availability of Citizen Suits, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 393, 414 (1997) (quoting 
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 26 (2d ed. 1994)); see also JOHN E. BONINE & 
THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:  CASES-LEGISLATION-
POLICIES 346 (2d ed. 1992). 
 225. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 192–93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing S. 2770, 92d 
Cong., § 2, at 93 (1971); H.R. 11896, 92d Cong. § 2, at 297; S. CONF. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 128–29 
(1972)). 
 226. See supra notes 185–89 and accompanying text.  
 227. See supra notes 190–98 and accompanying text.  
 228. See supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text.  
 229. See supra notes 203–218 and accompanying text.  
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 As a general matter, it is rational for agencies to take into account 
important public policies that impact a few entities and that were not part 
of the agency’s considerations when it promulgated a regulation.  This 
assumes, of course, that the extraneous policy objective itself is valid, 
and some of these objectives have been the subject of criticism.  Some 
analysts, for example, are skeptical about the regulatory breaks that 
Congress has given small business.230  It also assumes that Congress or 
the agency properly balances environmental and other regulatory goals 
with these other concerns when it provides relief from environmental 
regulation.  After September 11, 2001, for example, it has become more 
difficult to know how to balance national security concerns with 
environmental protection mandates.231   
 Congress generally has limited the use of these adjustments in ways 
that protect people and the environment.  In some cases, the adjustment 
is a time extension, after which the regulated entity must come into 
compliance.232  In other cases, Congress has required as much regulatory 
protection as is feasible in light of the other policy objectives.233  Some 
of the national security adjustments, however, provide unqualified 
authority for the President or an agency to exempt regulated entities from 
the need to obey federal regulations.234  Thus, the extent of public and 
environmental protection will depend on how many times these 
exemptions are invoked and the extent of the risks posed by the 
exempted activities.  If the exemption provisions are only used 
occasionally and are limited to relatively small-scale risks, they would 
not generally impact the level of protection.  But even in those situations 
                                                     
 230. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 185, at 576 (“[s]pecial treatment of small firms has little 
beneficial effect on society and a host of serious bad effects”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy 
Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regulatory Compliance in Theory and Practice: The Case of OSHA, 52 
ADMIN. L. REV. 98, 132–33 (2000).  C. Steven Bradford, Does Size Matter?  An Economic Analysis 
of Small Business Exemptions from Regulation, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1 (2004), contends 
that small business exemptions may or may not be efficient depending on the size of the transactions 
costs involved in granting the exemptions.  The same author also has analyzed whether regulatory 
exemptions in general are economically justified.  C. Steven Bradford, The Cost of Regulatory 
Exemptions, 72 UMKC L. REV. 857 (2004). 
 231. See Christopher Gozdor, et al., Where Streets Have No Name: The Collision of 
Environmental Law and Information Policy in the Age of Terrorism, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10978 
(2003). 
 232. See, e.g., supra note 189 and accompanying text (time extension under RCRA for small 
businesses); supra note 200 and accompanying text (temporary suspension under CAA). 
 233. See, e.g., supra note 212 and accompanying text (explaining that the ESA requires 
reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures); supra note 217 and accompanying text 
(explaining that the ESA requires such other measures as the agency determines are necessary and 
appropriate). 
 234. See, e.g., supra notes 190–98 and accompanying text.  
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they may have a significant adverse impact on persons living near the 
facility that is exempted.235 
 
6. Open-Ended Adjustments 
 
 As the survey of statutory back-end adjustments above demonstrates, 
Congress typically spells out in the statute the criteria the agency must 
use in deciding whether to provide a particular kind of back-end 
adjustment.  Occasionally, however, the statute delegates broad authority 
to the agency to decide not only whether to issue such adjustments but 
also the grounds upon which to issue them.   
 
a. Availability 
 
 Our survey found only one example of an open-ended authorization.  
It relates to EPA’s authority under the CWA to issue standards of 
performance for marine sanitation devices, which are devices for sewage 
treatment by vessels.236  The statute allows the Secretary of the 
department in which the Coast Guard is operating to “waive applicability 
of standards and regulations as necessary or appropriate” for individual 
vessels.237  The statute provides no guidance on when such a waiver 
would be necessary or appropriate. 
 
b. Evaluation 
 
 The previous categories of adjustments are based on specific criteria 
that Congress has established.  Congress, however, has not always 
limited an agency’s discretion in this fashion.  The CWA, for example, 
authorizes EPA to waive the applicability of standards and regulations 
relating to marine sanitation devices “as necessary or appropriate.”238  
This type of authorization is highly problematic as a policy matter 
because it fails to rein in EPA’s authority by specifying the factors the 
agency is to balance in granting an adjustment.  There is no need for 
Congress to do business in this fashion.  As the previous discussion 
indicates, Congress has a number of ways that it can provide for 
                                                     
 235. See Gozdor et al., supra note 231, at 10984 (highlighting stories of water pollution at 
military installations). 
 236. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(1), 1321(a)(3) (2000). 
 237. Id. § 1322(c)(2). 
 238. Id.  
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adjustments and provide for specific criteria that indicate when a 
regulated entity is eligible for the adjustment.  As Judge Leventhal 
stated: 
 
Sound administrative procedure contemplates waivers, or exceptions 
granted only pursuant to a relevant standard—expressed at least in 
decisions accompanied by published opinions, especially during a 
period when an approach is in formation, but best expressed in a rule 
that obviates discriminatory approaches.  The agency may not act out 
of unbridled discretion or whim in granting waivers any more than in 
any other aspect of its regulatory function.  The process viewed as a 
whole leads to a general rule, and limited waivers or exceptions granted 
pursuant to an appropriate general standard.  This combination of a 
general rule and limitations is the very stuff of the rule of law, and with 
diligent effort and attention to essentials administrative agencies may 
maintain the fundamentals of principled regulation without sacrifice of 
administrative flexibility and feasibility.239 
 
 The absence of statutory standards for the issuance of back-end 
adjustments invites arbitrary and discriminatory regulation, and the 
absence of limitations requiring the agency to minimize health, safety, or 
environmental risk creates the potential for the adjustment process to 
thwart regulatory goals. 
 
7. Conclusion 
  
 Congress has authorized a significant number of back-end 
adjustments for a variety of purposes in the statutes that we surveyed.  
Each of the five statutes we surveyed authorizes the administering 
agency to make back-end adjustments to regulatory standards or 
prohibitions.  In all but one case (the CWA waivers for standards of 
performance for sewage treatment by vessels), the statutes spell out the 
substantive criteria for issuance of these adjustments.  Each of the five 
statutes allows an agency to alter regulatory requirements when the 
activity for which an adjustment is sought does not pose a risk of the 
kind of harm targeted by those requirements.  All of the statutes provide 
for some sort of adjustment based on economic hardship or technological 
unavailability.  Each, except RCRA, includes authorization to issue 
                                                     
 239. WAIT Radio v.FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
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technology-improvement adjustments.240  The CWA and RCRA 
authorize adjustments on fairness grounds.  All five statutes provide for 
the issuance of adjustments as a means of avoiding a conflict between the 
environmental goals that the regulatory standards seek to promote and 
conflicting goals or policies that are allowed to trump the environmental 
goals.  National security concerns provide the most common such 
conflict, but the statutes also seek to accommodate other concerns as 
diverse as the viability of small businesses and preservation of the 
lifestyle of Alaskan Natives.   
 For the most part, the criteria that Congress has established for the 
issuance of back-end adjustments should lead to more rational public 
policy according to the previous analysis.  Each of the first five kinds of 
back-end adjustments we described above has the potential to improve 
regulatory policy.  Harm-based adjustments preclude the need for a 
regulated entity to incur compliance costs when it does not pose the kind 
of risk to health, safety, or the environment that the regulation from 
which the adjustment is sought was designed to prevent.  Accordingly, 
these adjustments prevent “treatment for treatment’s sake” by requiring 
control when its absence would do no harm.  Hardship-based 
adjustments provide a means for agencies to take cost into account in 
determining the appropriate level of regulation for a particular regulated 
entity without requiring the agency to conduct a formal cost-benefit 
analysis.  Information about the cost of compliance of a particular firm or 
the availability of control technology to that firm is likely to be more 
readily available and accurate than the results of a cost-benefit analysis 
that requires quantification of values that are resistant to expression in 
terms of dollars and cents (and that ought not to be so expressed on 
moral grounds).  Moreover, if a hardship-based adjustment is issued only 
on the condition that the recipient of the adjustment continue to provide 
substantial environmental protection, then such an adjustment should not 
undercut the purpose of the regulatory program. 
 Technology-improvement adjustments enable the agency granting 
them to allow greater levels of harm to occur in the short run in exchange 
for a commitment on the part of the regulated entity receiving the 
adjustment to conduct research and development into more effective or 
efficient risk-reduction technology.  If the research succeeds, the agency 
                                                     
 240. RCRA perhaps lacks explicit authorization for technology-improvement adjustments 
because the land disposal restrictions for certain hazardous wastes are themselves designed to 
facilitate the development of effective treatment technologies. 
 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 44 
may be able to ratchet up the level of control for one or more entire 
industries, thereby more than offsetting the short-term increase in risk 
that resulted from issuance of the adjustment.  Fairness-based 
adjustments permit the agency to promulgate regulations based on 
representative conditions within an industry without having to take the 
time to investigate every peculiarity within the regulated community.  If 
it later turns out that it does not make sense to apply the regulations to a 
particular entity because it finds itself in a unique situation of which the 
agency was not aware when it issued the classwide regulations, the 
agency can adjust that entity’s obligations to accommodate its unique 
situation.  Finally, policy conflict-based adjustments reflect a recognition 
on the part of Congress that there may be instances in which important 
social policies (like protection of small businesses or the national 
security) ought to override, at least in part, the desire to achieve 
reductions in the risk to health, safety, or the environment.  Instead of 
simply sacrificing environmental values wholesale, the statutes vest in 
the President or in a regulatory agency the authority to adjust the 
obligations imposed by statute only to the extent necessary to 
accommodate the conflicting policy.  The adjustment is sometimes 
conditioned by requiring the maintenance of some degree of protection 
of health, safety, or the environment. 
 The conclusion that these kinds of back-end adjustments have the 
potential to improve the rationality of regulation assumes that an agency 
applies the criteria for issuance sensibly and in good faith.  If not, back-
end adjustments have the potential to frustrate an agency’s statutory 
mission to protect people and the environment.  In light of this potential 
downside to the back-end adjustment process, it is important to ensure 
that agencies are accountable for the decisions they make to issue back-
end adjustments.  In the next section, we discuss the degree to which 
agencies are accountable under current legislation and recommend 
changes to current procedures that would make agencies even more 
accountable. 
 
IV. THE BACK-END EFFORT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 The efficacy of a back-end adjustment process depends not only on 
suitable criteria but on how well an agency implements the process.  This 
section considers the potential for misuse of back-end adjustments and 
then considers whether existing procedures sufficiently guard against this 
potential.  To make this determination, we surveyed the same five 
statutes considered in Part III to identify what procedures are used.  We 
conclude that notice and comment procedures are generally sufficient to 
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ensure the accountability of the back-end process if augmented by two 
steps that would increase the transparency of the process for considering 
back-end adjustments.  We propose that agencies create electronic 
reading rooms for back-end adjustment documents and report annually 
on the back-end process.   
 
A.  The Potential for Misuse 
 
 The statutory mission of an agency can be frustrated by the back-end 
process in three ways.  Regulators can rely too heavily on an adjustment 
process, they can fail to consider the cumulative effects of adjustments, 
or they can grant adjustments in bad faith. 
 Excessive reliance on back-end adjustments can water down a rule to 
the point that it is far less effective in protecting the public or the 
environment than it would be if implemented as designed and without 
adjustments.  Moreover, once the exceptions swallow a rule, regulatory 
policy becomes incoherent.241  Excessive reliance on an adjustment 
process also will encourage regulated entities not to comply with the 
original rule.  Companies will be reluctant to invest the money it takes to 
comply with a regulation if they think there is a good chance that they 
can obtain a favorable adjustment of some sort.  Indeed, as noted above, 
regulators should interpret a large number of legitimate applications for 
adjustments as evidence that the original rule needs to be reassessed.  In 
this circumstance, reassessment is a more rational approach than granting 
a large number of adjustments.   
 The integrity of a rule may also be threatened if regulators fail to 
consider the cumulative impact of the adjustments.242  In particular, 
regulators should be concerned that exceptions will cause some people or 
some areas of the environment to be subject to greater risks than people 
or areas in which the original regulation is enforced.  This result may 
occur if an agency grants adjustments to firms located in close proximity 
to one another. 
 Finally, in the hands of industry-friendly regulators, an adjustment 
process can become a means to water down regulation by granting 
                                                     
 241. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 172. 
 242. Id.; see Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative 
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297,  299 (1999) (arguing the broad 
exception process created under the Endangered Species Act “threatens to eclipse the rest of the 
statute”); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey From 
Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 138 (1998) (arguing that EPA’s 
administration of Project XL has become a “regulatory free-for-all”). 
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adjustments that are undeserved or weakly supported while maintaining 
the illusion that a protective regulatory regime remains in place.243    
 
B. The Administrative Process 
 
 This section surveys the five statutes under review to determine what 
procedures agencies use to make back-end adjustments.  The following 
section then assesses how well these procedures guard against the 
potential problems we have identified.   
 Agencies use both adjudication and rulemaking to adopt back-end 
adjustments.  Adjudication occurs when an agency determines the 
outcome of a request for a back-end adjustment under a statutory 
provision or regulation that makes an adjustment available if the 
applicant meets certain criteria.244  Rulemaking is necessary when there 
is no pre-existing statutory or regulatory provision that authorizes a back-
end adjustment.  In this circumstance, a back-end adjustment requires an 
agency to amend an existing regulation to permit the applicant to engage 
in some form of adjusted compliance. 
 For both adjudication and rulemaking, agencies use three 
approaches.  For most adjudications and rulemakings, agencies provide 
public notice (usually through publication in the Federal Register) and 
allow the public to file comments on a proposed adjustment.  In a few 
instances, there may be a legislative-type hearing and there are three 
situations in which agencies use formal, trial-like procedures.   
 
1. Adjudication 
 
 Many of the back-end adjustments involve adjudication.  We found 
numerous examples of adjudications under the CWA, RCRA, the CAA, 
and the ESA.   
 CWA.  The CWA does not prescribe procedures for the issuance of 
most of the back-end adjustments it authorizes.  It is generally silent on 
the procedures that EPA (or authorized permitting states) must use when 
considering whether to issue hardship-based,245 harm-based,246 
                                                     
 243. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 173. 
 244. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6)–(7) (2000) (defining adjudication under the APA). 
 245. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c), (i). 
 246. Id. § 1311(g).  The statute does specify that modifications of secondary treatment 
requirements for publicly owned treatment works shall take the form of permit provisions issued by 
EPA with the concurrence of the state.  Id. § 1311(h).  Under EPA regulations, states may have to 
certify compliance with the CWA in the course of considering variance requests under this 
provision.  40 C.F.R. § 124.54 (2003). 
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technology-improvement,247 fairness-based,248 policy conflict-based,249 
and open-ended250 adjustments.251   
 Although the CWA does not specify any hearing procedures, EPA’s 
regulations fill this gap.  These procedural regulations apply generally to 
the disposition of applications for permits or permit renewals by point 
sources, and it is during this process that an applicant can apply for a 
back-end adjustment.252  The regulations provide that “[d]ecisions on 
[National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System] variance requests 
ordinarily will be made during the permit issuance process.  Variances 
and other changes in permit conditions ordinarily will be decided through 
the same notice-and-comment and hearing procedures as the basic 
permit.”253  The burden of proof for these adjustments is on the applicant 
seeking the adjustment.254  The basic permit hearing procedures, which 
also apply to the issuance of permits for treatment, storage, and disposal 
facilities under RCRA,255 require that EPA (or a state authorized by EPA 
to issue CWA or RCRA permits) provide public notice when the agency 
has tentatively denied a permit, prepared a draft permit, or scheduled a 
hearing.256  Public notice of the preparation of a draft permit or of a 
                                                     
 247. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(k), 1317(e). 
 248. Id. § 1311(n). 
 249. Id. § 1323(a) (authorizing Presidential exemptions “in the paramount interest of the United 
States”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(4) (authorizing a similar exemption under the CAA for federal 
facilities from national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants on national security grounds); 
id. § 7418(b) (authorizing CAA exemption for federal facilities “in the paramount interest of the 
United States”); id. § 7671c(f) (authorizing Presidential exemptions under the CAA from 
prohibitions on the production and use of ozone-depleting substances on national security grounds; 
congressional notification required). 
 250. 33 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2). 
 251. In one case, the statute mandates that EPA “hold a public hearing” before modifying a 
water quality-related effluent limitation.  Id. § 1312(b)(1)–(2)(A).  As indicated above, however, 
EPA has never implemented this provision.  See supra note 224 and accompanying text 
 252. The regulations specify time limits for the filing of requests for FDF variances, hardship-
based variances, and harm-based variances under the CWA.  40 C.F.R. § 122.21(m)–(n) (2003). 
 253. Id. § 124.51(b). 
 254. See, e.g., id. § 125.32(b) (placing the burden on the person requesting FDF variances). 
 255. Id. § 124.1(a). 
 256. Id. § 124.10(a)(1).  The contents of the notice are described at section 124.10(d)(1), 
including a brief description of the comment procedures and the time and place of any hearing to be 
held.  The regulations also require that the applicant for a RCRA permit “hold at least one meeting 
with the public in order to solicit questions from the community and inform the community of 
proposed hazardous waste management activities.”  Id. § 124.31(b).  The applicant must provide at 
least 30 days prior notice of the meeting.  Id. § 124.31(d).  In addition, EPA or the state must notify 
the public that RCRA permit applications have been submitted and are available for review.  Id. § 
124.32(b)(1). 
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decision to deny a permit requires at least thirty days for public 
comment.257   
 The agency must “notify the applicant and each person who has 
submitted written comments or requested notice of the final permit 
decision.”258  The final decision must include a response to significant 
comments on the draft permit raised during the comment period or 
during a hearing.259  Final decisions must be based on the administrative 
record, which includes the record for the draft permit, all comments 
received during the comment period, the response to comments, and the 
final permit.260  Within thirty days after the final permit decision, “any 
person who filed comments on [the] draft permit . . . may petition the 
Environmental Appeals Board to review any condition of the permit 
decision.”261 
 One CWA adjustment may require a formal hearing.  Decisions on 
whether to issue a more lenient effluent limitation under the CWA for a 
point source engaging in a thermal discharge must be made by EPA or 
the state “after opportunity for public hearing.”262  One court has 
concluded that this language triggers formal adjudication under the APA 
for the imposition of thermal discharge limitations.263  This decision has 
been criticized by commentators,264 and subsequent court decisions cast 
doubt on whether formal adjudication is required under a statute merely 
on the basis of a reference to an “opportunity for public hearing.”265  
EPA’s regulations do not require formal adjudication for permit 
decisions concerning thermal dischargers.266 
                                                     
 257. Id. § 124.10(b)(1).  For RCRA permits, the regulations require a minimum of 45 days 
notice.  Id. 
 258. Id. § 124.15(a).  The regulations specify time frames for issuance of decisions on 
adjustment requests when EPA is the permitting authority.  Id. § 124.63. 
 259. Id. § 124.17(a)(2). 
 260. Id. § 124.18(a)–(b).  The administrative record must also include the tape or transcript of 
any hearing and of any written materials submitted at a hearing 
 261. 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a).  A person who participated in the public hearing is also qualified to 
bring a lawsuit.   
 262. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2000). 
 263. In Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978), the court held 
that formal adjudication was required in permit proceedings conducted under § 1326(a) even though 
the statute does not require that the determination be made “on the record.”  Id. at 876–78.  See also 
United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 833–34 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 264. E.g., ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.2.1, at 
202–04 (2d ed. 2001); KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 8.2, at 382–83 (3d ed. 1994).  
 265. See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1480–81 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(formal adjudication not required for issuance of corrective orders under RCRA). 
 266. See 40 C.F.R. § 124.66. 
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 RCRA.  Like the CWA, RCRA provides little guidance as to the 
procedures that should be used in considering requests for back-end 
adjustments.  The statute is silent on the procedures EPA must use in 
determining whether to allow land disposal of hazardous wastes when an 
entity asserts that the prohibition on disposal is not necessary to protect 
health and the environment.267  Nor does the statute speak to what 
procedures are necessary when EPA provides exemptions from 
groundwater monitoring requirements or requirements relating to the 
burning of hazardous waste as fuel.268  It does not indicate what 
procedures the President must follow when he determines that “the 
paramount interests of the United States” support exemption of federal 
facilities from solid or hazardous waste management requirements.269  
RCRA does allow hardship-based extensions of the deadlines for 
compliance with land disposal prohibitions to be issued “after notice and 
opportunity for comment and after consultation with appropriate State 
agencies in all affected States.”270  Likewise, EPA or an authorized state 
agency may modify the prohibition on the receipt, storage, or treatment 
of hazardous waste at surface impoundments “after notice and 
opportunity for comment.”271   
 EPA’s regulations describe notice and comment procedures for many 
of the RCRA back-end adjustments, just as they do for many of the 
adjustments available under the CWA.272  For example, “[a]ny person 
who generates, treats, stores, or disposes of hazardous waste may submit 
an application . . . for an extension to the effective date of any 
applicable” RCRA restriction.273  EPA may grant an extension “after 
notice and opportunity for comment, and after consultation with 
appropriate State agencies in all affected States.”274  EPA must provide 
public notice of its intent to approve or deny a petition and provide an 
opportunity for public comment.275  Final decisions must be published in 
the Federal Register.276  Entities subject to RCRA’s land disposal 
                                                     
 267. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)(1), (e)(1), (g)(5). 
 268. Id. § 6924(p), (q). 
 269. Id. § 6961(a). 
 270. Id. § 6924(h)(3). 
 271. Id. § 6925(j)(4). 
 272. As indicated above, if any back-end adjustment is issued in the course of a RCRA permit 
proceeding for treatment, storage, or disposal facilities, the procedures are similar to those that apply 
to CWA permits.  See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 273. 40 C.F.R. § 268.5(a) (2003). 
 274. Id. § 268.5(e). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
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restrictions also may submit a petition seeking exemptions from those 
restrictions on the ground “that there will be no migration of hazardous 
constituents from the disposal unit.”277  Again, EPA must provide notice 
of its “intent to approve or deny a petition and provide an opportunity for 
public comment” and must publish the final decision in the Federal 
Register.278  The regulations also authorize a generator or treater of 
hazardous waste to file a petition for a variance from the treatment 
standards for hazardous wastes subject to land disposal restrictions.279  
The procedures are the same as those that apply to petitions for 
exemptions from the land disposal restrictions.280 
 CAA. The CAA does not specifically dictate procedures for the 
issuance of some back-end adjustments, such as hardship-based 
adjustments to primary nonferrous smelters281 and waivers from the 
oxygenated fuels requirements for carbon monoxide nonattainment 
areas.282  EPA regulations require notice and opportunity for public 
hearing for at least some of these adjustments.283  For some adjustments, 
such as the technology-improvement deadline extensions for new sources 
using innovative technological systems of emission reduction, the CAA 
requires that EPA make its determinations “after notice and opportunity 
for public hearing,” but the CAA says nothing else about the form or 
content of those proceedings.284 
 Other adjustments are subject to the procedures that govern the 
issuance of permits.  For example, hardship-based adjustments from the 
limitations on nitrogen oxides emissions promulgated under the acid 
deposition control program are issued by “permitting authorit[ies].”285  
                                                     
 277. Id. § 268.6(a). 
 278. Id. § 268.6(j). 
 279. Id. § 268.44(a). 
 280. Id. § 268.44(e) (requiring public notice and opportunity for public comment). 
 281. But the statute does require that EPA conduct a hearing if it determines that the state has 
not issued the order in accordance with the requirements of the CAA.  42 U.S.C. § 7419(a)(1)(B) 
(2000). 
 282. Id. § 7545(m)(3).  That provision authorizes any person to petition EPA for an extension of 
the deadline for compliance with these requirements based on the inadequacy of supplies of 
oxygenated gasoline, but it does not specify the procedures to be used in responding to such 
petitions.  Id. § 7545(m)(3)(C). 
 283. E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 57.201(d)(4) (primary nonferrous smelter orders). 
 284. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(j)(1).  For other adjustments under the CAA that require notice and 
opportunity for either public hearings or comment, see id. § 7410(f)(1) (petitions for temporary 
emergency suspensions of state implementation plan provisions); id. § 7521(b)(4) (waivers from 
standards for emissions of oxides of nitrogen from light-duty motor vehicles); id. § 7671(c)(1)–(3), 
(d)(6), (e)(1), (g)(1) (various policy conflict-based exemptions from prohibitions on the production 
and use of ozone-depleting substances). 
 285. Id. § 7651f(d); see also id. § 7651g(a) (“The provisions [of the acid deposition control 
program] shall be implemented . . . by permits issued to units . . . in accordance with the provisions 
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Under the CAA, permitting authorities must notify EPA and other 
affected states of permit applications and proposed permits.286  In 
addition, EPA will not approve a state permit program under the CAA 
unless, among other things, it contains “[a]dequate, streamlined, and 
reasonable procedures” for public notice, including an opportunity for 
public comment and a hearing.287  A state program also must provide an 
opportunity for judicial review in state court “by the applicant, any 
person who participated in the public comment process, and any other 
person who could obtain judicial review . . . under applicable law.”288 
 The procedures for CAA permits are similar to those for CWA and 
RCRA permits.  EPA regulations require that the permitting authority 
give public notice of actions such as initial denial of a permit application, 
preparation of a draft permit, and scheduling of a hearing.289  The 
permitting authority must allow at least thirty days for public 
comment.290  During the comment period on a draft permit, any 
interested person may submit written comments and request a hearing.291  
The permitting authority may hold a public hearing whenever it finds a 
significant degree of public interest in a draft permit or whenever a 
hearing might clarify one or more issues involved in the permit 
decision.292  Any person may submit oral or written statements and data 
concerning the draft permit.293  The permitting authority must notify each 
person who has submitted written comments or requested notification of 
                                                                                                                       
of [the title V permit program].”  EPA regulations allow those seeking alternative emission 
limitations under this program to “petition the permitting authority,” although the procedures 
applicable to such petitions are not spelled out.  40 C.F.R. § 76.10(a)(1).  Technology-improvement 
alternative emission limitations for sources emitting hazardous air pollutants are also issued by 
permit.  42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(5)(A), (D); 40 C.F.R. §§ 71.21–71.27.  Permits also control technology-
improvement reassignments of sulfur dioxide reduction requirements under the acid deposition 
control program and technology-improvement requests for extensions of the deadline for meeting 
those requirements.  42 U.S.C. § 7651c(b), (c)(1), (d)(1).  EPA regulations provide for the issuance 
of technology-improvement compliance extensions from national emission standards for hazardous 
air pollutants in the course of the Title V CAA permit process.  40 C.F.R. §§ 63.72; 63.77(a), (g). 
 286. 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(a). 
 287. Id. § 7661a(b)(6). 
 288. Id. 
 289. 40 C.F.R. § 71.11(d)(1)(i). 
 290. Id. § 71.11(d)(2)(i). 
 291. Id. § 71.11(e).  The permitting authority must respond to comments when it issues a final 
decision.  Id. § 71.11(j)(1). 
 292. Id. § 71.11(f)(1)–(2). 
 293. Id. § 71.11(f)(5).  A tape recording or written transcript of the hearing must be made 
available to the public.  Id. § 71.11(f)(6). 
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the final permit decision, and the notification must make reference to the 
procedures for appeal of a final permit decision.294 
 ESA.  The ESA provides for informal notice-and-comment 
procedures for most of the back-end adjustments it authorizes.  The 
Interior Department must publish notice in the Federal Register of each 
application for an exemption or permit concerning the statute’s taking 
prohibition.295  The notice must invite interested persons to make written 
submissions relating to the application.296  The Department must make 
information it receives as part of an application available to the public at 
every stage of the proceeding.297  These procedures apply to technology-
improvement permits and incidental take permits and to hardship-based 
and subsistence exemptions from the taking requirement.298  Interior 
Department regulations299 require only that the agency publish notice in 
the Federal Register of each application for a permit to take endangered 
wildlife for scientific purposes or to enhance propagation or survival300 
or for an incidental take permit.301  The notice must invite written 
submissions by interested parties.302  The same procedures apply to 
permits to take based on the prevention of undue economic hardship.303 
 One back-end ESA adjustment, however, requires a formal hearing.  
Federal agencies, states, or permit applicants may seek exemptions from 
the ESA’s no jeopardy provision from the Endangered Species 
Committee.  When the Interior Secretary receives an application for an 
exemption, he or she must notify the governor of each affected state and 
publish notice of receipt of the application in the Federal Register.304  If 
the Secretary determines that the concerned federal agency and the 
                                                     
 294. Id. § 71.11(i).  The regulations governing acid rain permits are governed by procedures 
similar to those applicable to the CAA permit procedures described above.  See, e.g., id. § 72.62(d) 
(requiring opportunity for public comment and opportunity to request a public hearing on draft 
permit); id. § 72.65 (requiring public notice of opportunities for public comment); id. § 72.66(a) 
(granting right of any person to submit written comments on draft permit); id. § 72.67 (requiring 
opportunity for public hearing); id. § 72.68 (obligating consideration of and response to comments). 
 295. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(c) (2000). 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. The statute makes these procedures applicable to “an exemption or permit which is made 
under this section.”  Id.  The relevant permit and exemption provisions are at id. § 1539(a)(1)(A)–
(B), (b), (e).  The statute is silent on the procedures that apply to exemptions from the no jeopardy 
prohibition issued by the Secretary of Defense on national security grounds.  Id. § 1536(j). 
 299. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22. 
 300. Id. § 17.22(a)(1). 
 301. Id. § 17.22(a)(2). 
 302. Id. § 17.22. 
 303. Id. § 17.23.  They also apply to applications for permits to take threatened wildlife.  Id. § 
17.32(b)(1)(ii). 
 304. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(2)(B) (2000); 50 C.F.R. § 451.02(h). 
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exemption applicant have met certain consultation and assessment 
requirements, the Secretary, in consultation with the members of the 
Committee, must hold a hearing on the exemption application in 
accordance with the APA’s requirements for formal adjudication.305  All 
meetings and records resulting from exemption proceedings are open to 
the public.306  The Committee must grant an exemption if it determines 
“on the record” that the statutory criteria are met.307  That phrase is also 
evocative of formal procedures.308 
 Interior Department regulations provide for the use of formal 
adjudication in the development of a report to the Endangered Species 
Committee.309  An administrative law judge presides over the required 
hearing.310  The regulations require that notice of hearings and prehearing 
conferences be published in the Federal Register.311  The parties to the 
proceedings include the exemption applicant, the federal agency 
responsible for the agency action in question, and any intervenors.312  
The administrative law judge must grant leave to intervene if an 
intervenor’s participation would contribute to a “fair determination of the 
issues,” taking into account whether the intervenor represents a point of 
view not already adequately represented.313 
 The regulations also specify the procedures that govern the 
Committee’s deliberations, although the applicable procedures are less 
formal and elaborate than those that apply to the Secretary’s 
determinations.  If the Committee finds that written submissions are 
necessary to enable the Committee to make its final determinations, it 
must publish in the Federal Register a notice inviting written submissions 
from interested persons.314  The Committee must convene a public 
hearing if oral presentations are necessary to enable the Committee to 
make its final determinations.315  The Committee must publish a notice of 
                                                     
 305. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(4), (6). 
 306. Id. § 1536(g)(8); 50 C.F.R. § 425.05(f).  These procedures do not appear to apply to 
exemptions from the no jeopardy prohibition issued by the President to prevent the recurrence of 
national disasters.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(p). 
 307. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A). 
 308. The APA’s procedures for formal adjudication apply to cases of adjudication “required by 
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.”  5 U.S.C. § 554(a).   
 309. 50 C.F.R. § 425.05(a)(1). 
 310. Id. § 425.05(a)(2). 
 311. Id. § 425.05(c). 
 312. Id. § 452.06(a). 
 313. Id. § 452.06(b)(2). 
 314. Id. § 453.04(a). 
 315. Id. § 453.04(b)(1). 
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the hearing in the Federal Register.316  The hearing is open to the public 
and is “conducted in an informal manner.”317  All information relevant to 
the Committee’s decision is admissible.318 
 
2. Rulemaking 
 
 Agencies rely on rulemaking to a lesser extent in making back-end 
adjustments.  Nevertheless, rulemaking procedures are used in RCRA, 
the CAA, the ESA, and the OSH Act. 
 RCRA.  In some instances, the government rules on requests for 
back-end adjustments such as petitions for delisting regulated chemicals 
or endangered species by conducting informal rulemaking proceedings.  
EPA must provide notice and opportunity for comment before granting 
or denying a petition to delist a hazardous substance under RCRA if it 
considers factors that could cause a waste to be a hazardous waste “other 
than those for which the waste was listed.”319  EPA’s regulations 
authorize any person to file a “petition for a regulatory amendment” to 
exclude from RCRA regulation a waste generated at a particular 
facility.320  EPA must publish notice of a tentative decision to grant or 
deny such a petition in the Federal Register “in the form of an advanced 
notice of proposed rulemaking, a proposed rule, or a tentative 
determination to deny the petition.”321  Upon the written request of any 
interested person, EPA, in its discretion, may “hold an informal public 
hearing to consider oral comments on the tentative decision.”322  EPA 
must publish its final decision in the Federal Register in the form of a 
regulatory amendment or a denial of the petition.323 
 One other form of back-end adjustment under RCRA is also subject 
to informal rulemaking procedures.  When Congress ordered EPA to 
make adjustments under RCRA for small quantity generators of 
hazardous waste, it mandated that EPA do so by promulgating 
“standards,”324 which presumably means regulations.  EPA has in fact 
                                                     
 316. Id. § 453.04(b)(3). 
 317. Id. § 453.04(b)(4). 
 318. Id. 
 319. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(f)(1) (2000).  The CAA is silent on the procedures that apply to petitions 
to delist hazardous air pollutants.  See id. § 7412(b)(3). 
 320. 40 C.F.R. § 260.22(a). 
 321. Id. § 260.20(c). 
 322. Id. § 260.20(d).  EPA also may decide on its own motion to hold a hearing.  Id. 
 323. Id. § 260.20(e). 
 324. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d). 
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issued the special provisions for small quantity generators by way of 
informal rulemaking.325 
 CAA.  Informal rulemaking also may provide the forum for certain 
CAA back-end adjustments.326  The states are free to provide waivers or 
variances from their implementation plans.  These adjustments may take 
the form of revisions to the plan.327  The statute requires that a revision to 
the implementation plan be adopted by the state “after reasonable notice 
and public hearing.”328  According to Professor Rodgers: 
 
The Clean Air Act extends no right to an adjudicatory hearing, and 
most states treat preparation of the plans as inviting legislative-type 
decisions where affected parties may appear and present statements but 
not participate further through cross-examination and submission of 
questions, unless a particular need is shown.329 
 
EPA regulations require that a state conduct at least one public hearing 
before adopting and submitting a plan revision to EPA.330  The state must 
supply at least thirty days’ notice before holding a hearing.331 
 ESA.  Petitions to list or delist species under the ESA also are subject 
to informal rulemaking procedures.  The Interior Department, for 
example, must publish in the Federal Register its findings as to whether a 
listing or delisting petition “presents substantial scientific evidence or 
commercial information indicating that the requested action may be 
warranted.”332  If the agency makes an affirmative finding, it must 
subsequently decide whether the requested action is warranted.333  If not, 
the agency must publish that finding in the Federal Register.334  If so, the 
                                                     
 325. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Management System, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,174 (Mar. 26, 1986) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 260–63, 270–71). 
 326. The CAA is silent on the procedures that apply to certain adjustments of SIPs, including 
temporary emergency suspensions issued by state governors under 42 U.S.C. § 7410(g) to prevent 
plant closings.   The governor may issue a temporary emergency suspension on the basis of a 
national or regional energy emergency “after notice and opportunity for public hearing.”  Id. § 
7410(f)(1). 
 327. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.104(d) (stating that, in order for a variance to be considered for approval 
as a revision to a state plan, “the State must submit it in accordance with the” procedures applicable 
to plan submissions). 
 328. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(l). 
 329. 1 RODGERS, supra note 66, § 3.9B, at 255–56. 
 330. 40 C.F.R. § 51.102(a). 
 331. Id. § 51.102(d). 
 332. 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b)(1).  See also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A). 
 333. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b)(1). 
 334. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(i); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b)(3)(i). 
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Department must issue a proposed regulation.335  The ESA specifies that 
the APA procedures for informal rulemaking apply to any regulation 
promulgated in response to a petition.336  The statute requires that the 
Interior Department provide actual notice of proposed listing or delisting 
regulations to the state agency in each state in which the species is 
believed to occur and invite each such agency to submit comments.337  
The agency may give notice to professional scientific organizations338 
and must publish a summary of the proposal in a newspaper of general 
circulation in each part of the United States in which the species is 
believed to occur.339  The ESA requires the Interior Department to hold a 
public hearing if any person requests one within forty-five days after 
public notification.340 
 OSH Act.  The OSH Act authorizes employers to apply to the 
Secretary of Labor “for a rule or order” for a harm-based variance from 
an occupational safety and health standard.341  A request for a rule would 
presumably be subject to rulemaking proceedings, while OSHA would 
consider a request for an order through adjudication.342  The statute 
dictates that the Secretary issue the rule or order “if he determines on the 
record, after opportunity for an inspection where appropriate and a 
hearing, that the proponent of the variance has demonstrated by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the conditions” the proponent 
proposes will provide places of employment that are as safe as those that 
would result from compliance with the standard from which the variance 
is sought.343  The APA requires that agencies use formal rulemaking 
procedures “[w]hen rules are required by statute to be made on the record 
after opportunity for an agency hearing.”344  The OSH Act references to a 
decision “on the record” and to an opportunity for a hearing trigger this 
                                                     
 335. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(ii); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b)(3)(ii). 
 336. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(4).  Those procedures are spelled out in the Interior Department’s 
regulations.  50 C.F.R. § 424.16(c). 
 337. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5)(A)(ii). 
 338. Id. § 1533(b)(5)(C). 
 339. Id. § 1533(b)(5)(D). 
 340. Id. § 1533(b)(5)(E); 50 C.F.R. § 424.16(c)(3). 
 341. 29 U.S.C. § 655(d). 
 342. The OSH Act also authorizes employers to apply for “a temporary order granting” a 
hardship-based variance.  Id. § 655(b)(6)(A).  The statute requires notice to employees and an 
opportunity for a hearing.  Id.  Because the statute does not require that the decision be based “on the 
record,” informal adjudication would seem to be the proper procedure for consideration of these 
hardship-based variances.  Nevertheless, OSHA has promulgated regulations that apply the same 
formal procedures to § 655(b)(6)(A) and § 655(d) variances.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1905.1(a)(1).  These 
same procedures also apply to back-end adjustments based on national security grounds under 29 
U.S.C. § 665.  29 C.F.R. § 1905.1(a)(2) (2003). 
 343. 29 U.S.C. § 655(d). 
 344. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
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APA requirement.345  Similarly, the OSH Act authorizes the Secretary, 
“on the record, after notice and opportunity for a hearing,” to issue “rules 
and regulations” that provide reasonable variations and exemptions from 
any provisions of the statute if he finds that such action is necessary “to 
avoid serious impairment of the national defense.”346 
 OSHA has issued regulations establishing formal procedures for both 
the harm-based and national security adjustments.347  Once OSHA 
determines that an application for a variance has been filed with the 
agency, it must publish a notice of the filing of the application in the 
Federal Register.348  The notice must include an invitation to interested 
persons to submit written information concerning the application.349  Any 
affected employer, employee, or state agency having jurisdiction over 
places of employment covered in the application for the variance or 
exemption may request a hearing on the application.350  The agency must 
convene a hearing whenever one is requested.351  A hearing officer 
vested with powers similar to those specified for administrative law 
judges under the APA352 presides over the hearing.353  OSHA’s 
regulations detail the availability of discovery354 and the manner in which 
hearings will be conducted.355  A party is entitled to present its case by 
oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to 
conduct cross-examination.356  The hearing examiner’s final decision 
must “be based upon a consideration of the whole record.”357  If a party 
files exceptions to the hearing examiner’s decisions, the Assistant 
Secretary of Labor reviews that decision.358  OSHA must publish every 
                                                     
 345. Similarly, if the employer applied for an order containing a variance, formal adjudication 
would seem to be required.  See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (“This section applies . . . in every case of 
adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency 
hearing.”). 
 346. 29 U.S.C. § 665. 
 347. By contrast, informal rulemaking governs the issuance of occupational safety and health 
standards, although OSHA’s procedures go beyond the minimum requirements of the APA.  29 
C.F.R. § 1911.15(a)(1), (b).   
 348. 29 C.F.R. § 1905.14(b)(1). 
 349. Id. § 1905.14(b)(2)(iii). 
 350. Id. § 1905.15(a). 
 351. Id. § 1905.20(a). 
 352. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c). 
 353. 29 C.F.R. § 1905.22(a). 
 354. Id. § 1905.25. 
 355. Id. § 1905.26. 
 356. Id. § 1905.26(c)(1).  Cross-examination is limited to whatever “is required for a full and 
true disclosure of the facts.”  Id. 
 357. Id. § 1905.27(b). 
 358. Id. § 1905.29. 
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final action granting a variance or exemption in the Federal Register.359  
Only a decision by the Assistant Secretary is regarded as a final agency 
action for purposes of judicial review.360 
 
C. Evaluation 
 
 Most of the back-end adjustments in the five statutes we have 
surveyed are subject to notice and comment adjudicatory procedures, 
particularly adjustments issued in the course of decisions on permit 
applications.  Informal rulemaking involving notice and comment 
procedures governs several adjustments, such as those involving requests 
for the delisting of chemicals regulated under RCRA or the CAA or of 
endangered or threatened species under the ESA.  In some instances, an 
agency may also hold a legislative-type hearing.  Formal adjudication is 
confined to requests to the Endangered Species Committee for 
exemptions from the ESA’s no jeopardy provision and perhaps to 
requests for more lenient restrictions on thermal discharges under the 
CWA.  Formal rulemaking governs only requests for certain variances 
and exemptions from occupational safety and health standards under the 
OSH Act.  This section analyzes the adequacy of existing procedures to 
promote public accountability concerning back-end adjustments.   
 
1. Notice and Comment Procedures 
 
 The type of notice and comment procedure that is employed for most 
of the back-end adjustments is the same type of procedure that is widely 
employed in the administrative process for making decisions about 
regulatory policy.  Nevertheless, there are reasons why it may not be 
adequate in the context of back-end adjustments in light of the resources 
available to the public to monitor the back-end process.      
 
a. Advantages 
 
 As Roger Cramton pointed out long ago, the potential benefits of 
administrative procedure—fairness and accuracy—need to be balanced 
against the “efficient disposition of [agency] business.”361  In light of the 
tradeoffs involved, a notice and comment process is generally considered 
                                                     
 359. Id. § 1905.6. 
 360. Id. § 1905.51. 
 361. Roger C. Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 
VA. L. REV. 585, 592 (1972). 
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adequate for promoting the accountability of public policy decisions for 
three reasons.   
 First, the procedures are efficient.  Since the agency is not involved 
in holding a hearing, it can make its decision relying entirely on the 
written input that it receives.   
 Second, notice and comment procedures are adequate to vet the 
issues involved because public policy decisions are normally based on 
scientific and policy information.362  The extra time and expense of using 
trial-type procedures, such as testimony and cross-examination, is 
considered to be unnecessary since these decisions do not involve 
specific facts that are within the knowledge of specific individuals.363  
Thus, the right to file written comments usually offers an adequate 
opportunity to contest scientific or policy information on which an 
agency may rely.364   
 The criteria that Congress has established for making back-end 
adjustments appear to involve mostly scientific and policy information.  
Harm-based adjustments authorize regulatory relief if a polluter does not 
create the same risk to people and the environment that a rule was 
designed to address.365  Technology-improvement adjustments authorize 
relief if it is likely to produce innovative abatement technologies.366  
Fairness-based adjustments involve claims that a firm cannot meet the 
abatement goal for reasons (other than cost, in the case of the CWA) not 
anticipated by the agency at the time a rule was adopted,367 and policy-
based adjustments involve balancing environmental and other policy 
goals.368 
 One form of adjustment—the hardship-based adjustment—may 
appear to be more on the borderline between scientific and policy facts 
and information that is uniquely known to a particular person.  This 
adjustment is available if a firm can demonstrate that compliance with a 
regulation involves a degree of economic hardship not anticipated by the 
agency when it adopted a rule.369  Nevertheless, it appears that informal 
procedures are adequate to resolve whatever adjudicatory facts might be 
                                                     
 362. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.3, at 
225–79 (3d ed. 1999). 
 363. Id.  
 364. Id.  
 365. See supra Part III.B.1.    
 366. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 367. See supra Part III.B.4. 
 368. See supra Part III.B.5. 
 369. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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in issue.370  First, the evidence regarding a firm’s economic hardship will 
be documentary, and it seems unlikely that testimony and cross-
examination will be necessary to assess its accuracy.371  Second, the 
firm’s claim of unique hardship can be judged by looking at information 
such as industry profitability data, which is publicly available.372  
Moreover, to qualify for this adjustment, a firm typically must still 
demonstrate its ability to protect people and the environment from some 
degree of risk, even if it is granted regulatory relief.373  An agency 
assessing whether a firm has made this showing will be analyzing 
scientific and policy information. 
 Third, an agency is subject to judicial review concerning its 
adjustment decisions,374 and a court would expect the agency to justify its 
decision in light of the comments that it has received.375  This gives 
interested parties the opportunity to contest an outcome that they oppose 
and requires the agency to rebut any relevant, substantial objections that 
were brought to its attention.376  Thus, the public is assured that an 
agency has to take seriously the comments that are filed.  The agency’s 
failure to respond adequately to significant comments will lead a court to 
remand a decision back to an agency to address such comments.   
 
b. Disadvantages 
 
 Despite the advantages of a notice and comment process, it may not 
be sufficient to ensure the proper use of back-end adjustments.  A back-
end adjustment process is subject to three potential problems that may 
not be solved by relying on notice and comment procedures.377   
                                                     
 370. See PIERCE, supra note 362, at 267 (“not all controversies concerning adjudicative facts 
require use of a judicial-type hearing”). 
 371. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1482–83 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(upholding EPA’s determination that a judicial-type hearing was unnecessary regarding a corrective 
order in part because there would be little need to establish witness credibility through demeanor 
evidence or cross-examination). 
 372. Id. (upholding EPA’s determination that a judicial-type hearing was unnecessary regarding 
a corrective order in part because evidentiary disputes could be resolved on the basis of the written 
evidence in the record). 
 373. See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text.  
 374. If the mandate that an agency uses to approve an adjustment does not provide for judicial 
review, the agency could be sued under the APA, which authorizes judicial review at the behest of 
persons “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action.”  5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).   
 375. See, e.g., Rodway v. USDA, 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (agency’s justification 
must “explain how the agency resolved any significant problems raised by the comments”). 
 376. See, e.g., Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“agency 
[must] set forth with clarity the grounds for its rejection of opposing views”). 
 377. In addition to the accountability problems addressed below, the back-end adjustment 
process may be subject to abuse if adjustments are issued by state agencies in the absence of 
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 First, Congress has failed to require any procedures for some back-
end adjustments, leaving it to the agency concerned to determine what 
type of procedures to use.378  As a general matter, Congress should 
mandate the use of administrative procedures when it authorizes the use 
of adjudication to implement back-end adjustments.  Otherwise, an 
agency is free to have no such procedures or to provide less procedural 
protection than is adequate for the decision-making process.  EPA has 
voluntarily plugged this gap,379 but without a legislative mandate, it 
would not have to do so. 
Second, without effective public monitoring, an agency may 
grant so many exceptions that a rule becomes incoherent,380 or 
unacceptable levels of harm to the public health or the environment may 
be threatened if regulators fail to consider the cumulative impact of the 
adjustments that they are making.381  If environmental and public interest 
groups are aware that this is happening, they can point it out to the 
agency when they file written comments in an adjustment proceeding.  
This pattern of behavior, however, may be difficult to spot due to the 
piecemeal nature of the regulatory adjustment process.  The groups could 
monitor the adjustment process on an ongoing basis to obtain 
information about the number and impact of adjustments, but this type of 
monitoring may require resources that the groups lack.  Moreover, due to 
the esoteric nature of regulatory adjustments, it seems unlikely that the 
press will serve this watch-dog role. 
Third, although notice and comment procedures are considered 
to be adequate to promote public accountability in rulemaking, back-end 
adjustments may pose a different situation than the promulgation of a 
rule.  Agencies may make a bad policy decision in both an initial 
rulemaking and a back-end adjustment, but it may be easier for interested 
                                                                                                                       
sufficient oversight.  Many of the back-end adjustments discussed in this Article may be issued only 
by EPA, although the statutes sometimes require concurrence by the state.  See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 
1311(c) (EPA may issue hardship-based adjustments under the CWA); id. § 1311(g) (EPA, with the 
concurrence of the state, may issue harm-based adjustments under the CWA); id. § 1311(n) (EPA, 
with the concurrence of the state, may issue FDF variances).  In other situations, the states may issue 
adjustments, but only with EPA’s approval.  Under the CAA, for example, variances adopted as SIP 
revisions are subject to EPA approval.  42 U.S.C. § 7410(l).  Although the subject of state issuance 
of back-end adjustments is largely beyond the scope of this Article, we favor vesting the states with 
the authority to issue back-end adjustments of the sort discussed in this Article only if a state’s 
decisions are subject to EPA oversight. 
 378. See, e.g., supra notes 245–50 and accompanying text.  
 379. See supra note 252–80 and accompanying text.  
 380. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.  
 381. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.  
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parties to influence the rulemaking process than the adjustment process.  
Agencies typically have only a few ongoing rulemakings at any one time, 
whereas EPA or other agencies might have many more adjustment 
proceedings.  In light of the limited resources of environmental and other 
public interest groups, they may not be able to participate in dozens of 
back-end proceedings that make regulatory adjustments.382  Moreover, 
even if they do participate, these groups may lack the scientific and 
technical resources to participate effectively in adjustment proceedings to 
the extent that such decisions turn on this information.383   
 Other papers presented in this symposium suggest that the lack of 
participation may be a significant problem.  David Cozad, an EPA 
attorney who participated in this symposium, noted that, in his 
experience, there is almost no involvement of public interest groups or 
others in adjustment proceedings.384  Professor Rechtschaffen likewise 
observed that there was limited or no citizen or interest group 
participation in enforcement proceedings.385  If public interest groups or 
citizens are unable to participate in enforcement proceedings, this would 
suggest that they would be unable to participate in adjustment 
proceedings. 
 Nevertheless, there are also reasons to think that notice and comment 
procedures will provide accountability.  First, if the policy process is 
reoriented as we recommend, there will be a less cumbersome and 
elaborate process at the front-end, which should free up resources for 
public interest groups to participate at the back-end.  Second, even 
without this shift, state and local environmental groups could focus their 
efforts on the adjustment process.386  The lack of such participation at the 
moment may be attributable to the lack of transparency of this process, 
which we address in the next section.   
 
2. Hearing Procedures 
                                                     
 382. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 173. 
 383. Id.  
 384. David Cozad, [title], 52 KAN. L. REV. ___ (2004). 
 385. Rechtschaffen, supra note 6, at 32. 
 386. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizen Advisory 
Boards in Environmental Decision-making, 73 IND. L.J. 903 (1998) (addressing the procedures for 
involving the public in environmental decision-making); Zygmunt B. Plater, A Modern Political 
Tribalism in Natural Resources Management, 11 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1990) (describing the way 
small groups of people living in cohesive affiliation have a narrowed community interest in natural 
resource management).  See also PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 233–34 (1993) (“Where the national groups are prone to settle their 
differences with polluters through compromise, the grass-roots groups usually will settle for nothing 
less than complete victory because the health of their children as well as their own and the 
habitability of their own homes are on the line.”). 
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 There is some reason to be concerned that notice and comment 
procedures, as currently structured, may not promote the necessary 
accountability for back-end adjustments.  The question, then, is whether 
there are additional procedures that Congress should require that would 
address these potential problems.  Congress could authorize interested 
persons to request a public hearing and require agencies to hold such a 
hearing upon some statutory trigger.  As our survey indicated, there are 
legislative-type hearings for some of the back-end adjustments, and a 
formal hearing is required in three instances.   
 A legislative-type hearing process would give interested parties an 
additional opportunity to influence the agency, but environmental and 
public interest groups can bring the same information to the attention of 
an agency in written comments as they can through testimony, assuming 
that the groups have the resources to participate effectively.  Indeed, 
written advocacy probably would be more effective than speaking orally 
for a short period of time.  Thus, a legislative-type hearing does not 
address the limitations of a notice and comment process in promoting the 
rationality of the back-end process.  A legislative-type hearing process 
would allow citizens who normally would not file comments to appear 
before the agency and make their views known, but such presentations 
are less likely to present policy information that is influential to an 
agency or a reviewing court, although it may indicate something about 
the extent and intensity of public support or opposition.   
 A more formal hearing process is not the answer either.  First, as 
noted earlier, procedures such as calling witnesses and cross-examination 
do not generally illuminate scientific and policy issues.387  Second, even 
if additional hearing rights gave interested members of the public a 
greater opportunity to build a record against back-end adjustments, 
participation in such a hearing is resource-intensive, which is likely to 
limit the number of environmental or public interest groups that could 
afford to participate, at least if the hearing procedures are frequently 
invoked.  Finally, expanded hearing rights might be used strategically by 
opponents of adjustments, such as competitors of the company 
requesting the adjustment.  Thus, this solution has the potential to slow 
down the approval process in cases where approval is in the public 
interest. 
 
                                                     
 387. See supra notes 362–64 and accompanying text. 
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D. Greater Transparency 
 
 A better way to improve public accountability is to increase the 
transparency of the back-end approval process.  The idea is to give the 
public access to information that allows interested persons to evaluate the 
extent to which the potential problems identified earlier might exist.  
More specifically, we propose that agencies be required to make all 
relevant information about the adjustment process available on the 
agency’s web site and that agencies be required to report annually to the 
public on their use of back-end adjustments, including information that 
bears on the problems that we have identified. 
 
1. Electronic Reading Rooms 
 
 Under existing notice and comment procedures, agencies are 
required to notify the public, usually in the Federal Register, that they 
have received a request for a back-end adjustment,388 but there is no 
further requirement that the other documents that comprise the decision-
making process be readily available to the public.  If someone wants to 
look at the comments that have been filed or the agency’s justification 
for granting or denying an application for an adjustment, he or she would 
have to visit the document room the agency maintains either in its 
headquarters in Washington or in an appropriate regional office to 
request the documents, or would have to locate and communicate with 
the appropriate agency employee to request that the documents be sent to 
him or her.   
 These hurdles would disappear if all of the written information 
relevant to adjustment proceedings were posted by an agency on its web 
site.  All regulatory agencies now have web sites and the government has 
established one location—www.firstgov.gov—that provides central 
access to all agency databases.  An electronic reading room for 
adjustment documents should be established within this framework. 
 Congress has already required agencies to make some documents 
available on the Internet, but this requirement probably would not force 
agencies to establish this type of electronic reading room.  The Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) obligates an agency to make available to the 
public other records in its files,389 except to the extent that the records fall 
within one of the exceptions from disclosure that Congress established.390  
                                                     
 388. See supra Part IV.B.1–2. 
 389. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2000). 
 390. Id. § 552(b). 
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The FOIA, therefore, would require an agency to divulge most, if not all, 
adjustment documents if requested by a member of the public.391  The 
FOIA further obligates an agency to make available to the public in a 
reading room “final opinions, including concurring and dissenting 
opinions, as well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases”392 and any 
other records that “the agency determines have become or are likely to 
become the subject of subsequent requests.”393  The Electronic Freedom 
of Information Act Amendments of 1996 require federal agencies to 
establish electronic reading rooms—i.e., web sites—for information that 
the FOIA requires to be made available in reading rooms.394  
Nevertheless, agencies are likely to escape from any legal obligation to 
establish a web site for adjustment documents on the grounds that they 
are not the subject of widespread requests.  It is unlikely that 
environmental or other public interest groups will be in a position to file 
numerous requests for such information, and agencies, therefore, are not 
likely to be bombarded with requests for such documents.   
 Since agencies can avoid establishing electronic reading rooms for 
adjustment documents, Congress should require them to establish such 
rooms.  Such legislation should also include some of the 
recommendations of the American Bar Association about how to make 
administrative proceedings more useful to members of the public via 
agency web sites.395  Concerning notice and comment rulemaking, the 
ABA has recommended that agencies provide “a means for interested 
persons to enroll for electronic notification of further developments in a 
matter,” post “notices of proposed rulemaking on the agency’s own site, 
and provid[e] opportunities for electronic comment there,” and post 
“required analyses, public comments, and other constituent elements of a 
rulemaking docket on the agency’s web site as far as practicable in 
readily searchable form.”396  The same requirements would be useful to 
the public in terms of monitoring the notice and comment procedures 
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used in informal adjudications by EPA that determine adjustment 
requests.   
 An electronic reading room for adjustment applications should lower 
the cost of participation for interested persons and groups.  A party can 
sign up for electronic notice that an application has been made and can 
monitor whether anyone has filed comments in favor of or in opposition 
to an application.  If groups have an easier way to monitor the process, 
they may be able to determine more easily which applications pose a 
threat to people and the environment and file comments in those 
proceedings.  If this occurs, an agency will be more accountable for its 
actions.   
 An electronic reading room will also permit interested persons to 
monitor whether an agency appears to be engaged in granting an 
excessive number of applications or whether the agency has taken into 
account the cumulative impact of the applications that it has granted.  
Since, however, these functions would require someone to engage in 
constant monitoring, or at least visit the reading room to see whether 
these problems might exist, we also recommend that Congress require 
agencies to publish an annual report, which would make monitoring of 
these potential problems easier. 
 
2. Annual Reports 
 
 Congress should also require an agency to publish an annual report 
on its web site concerning its adjustment activities.  This report should 
include statistics indicating the number of adjustment requests that the 
agency received and the disposition of those requests, both in total and in 
relationship to the statutory provisions that authorize adjustments.  The 
report should also organize this information by geographical area so that 
readers can determine the number and type of adjustments made under 
different statutory provisions in the same location.  Finally, Congress 
should require the agency to report on how the adjustment process has 
served the statutory goals of the statutes under which adjustments have 
been granted. 
 This report should make it easier to identify when an agency may 
have granted an excessive number of adjustments or failed to consider 
the cumulative impact of its adjustments.   If an agency has granted a 
large number of adjustments, either in total or concerning a particular 
statutory provision, it would alert interested persons to go to the agency’s 
electronic reading room and review the available information.  The goal 
would be to determine whether the adjustments appear to be justified and 
whether the agency has granted so many adjustments that the integrity of 
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a regulation is threatened.  Similarly, the report should make it easier to 
identify whether an agency has taken into account the cumulative impact 
of the adjustments it has granted.  If the agency has granted significant 
adjustments in one geographical area, readers could go to the electronic 
reading room to see if the agency has taken the cumulative impact of its 
adjustments into account when granting the adjustments. 
 Armed with the previous information, interested parties could take 
several steps to attempt to rein in inappropriate use of the adjustment 
process.  Environmental and other interest groups could use the 
information to prioritize their intervention in ongoing adjustment 
proceedings.  They could focus their efforts on those agencies and those 
adjustment proceedings where it appeared that an agency was acting 
inappropriately.  Thus, despite limited resources, the groups would have 
a better chance at heading off misuse or mistaken use of the adjustment 
process.  The same groups could call the attention of their political allies 
in Congress to any misuse of the adjustment process, which may result in 
political pressure being brought to bear on the agency.  Similarly, they 
could call the attention of the media to the misuse of the adjustment 
process by an agency, which may result in adverse publicity for the 
agency. 
 Annual reports are not likely to prevent all misuse of the adjustment 
process.  Environmental groups still may be hamstrung by limited 
resources despite prioritizing their intervention in adjustment 
proceedings.  The media may be uninterested in stories about a 
complicated, inside-the-beltway story about the administrative process.  
The political allies of environmental and other public interest groups may 
lack the clout to rein in misguided or captured agencies.  No 
administrative process, however, will prevent all misfeasance or 
malfeasance by the government.  Moreover, the greater degree of 
transparency that we propose will expose agencies to significant public 
monitoring of their actions, and the amount of oversight and concern will 
increase if agencies adopt the back-end adjustment process as an 
important method of adjusting regulatory policy.   
 
E. Conclusion 
 
 Most back-end adjustments occur using notice and comment 
procedures.  This approach is efficient, yet it gives the public an 
opportunity to present evidence or make arguments to which the courts 
expect agencies to respond.  A legislative-type hearing or a formal 
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hearing would reduce the efficiency of the adjustment process and is 
unnecessary to promote rational decision-making.   
 Notice and comment procedures are effective to hold an agency 
accountable for back-end adjustments, provided there is public 
participation.  The potential weakness of a back-end process is that 
environmental and other public interest groups, or individual citizens, 
may not participate because of the number of such adjustments and a 
lack of resources to participate effectively both on the front end and the 
back end of the process.  To enhance the ability of interested persons to 
oversee agencies’ use of back-end adjustments to make regulatory 
policy, we therefore propose that the back-end process be made more 
transparent by the use of electronic reading rooms and annual reports.   
 Greater transparency is not likely to produce public involvement in 
every adjustment decision or even in most adjustment decisions.  
Universal participation, however, is not necessary to have the back-end 
process work effectively.  First, many of the adjustment applications are 
likely to be routine and non-controversial.  Second, although the notice 
and comment process is a check on agency decision-making, this does 
not mean that agencies will make unreasonable decisions without public 
participation.  Third, we anticipate that local environmental groups will 
focus their advocacy on the adjustment process as it becomes a more 
central element in regulatory policy.  Finally, these and national 
advocates can monitor the back-end situation using the electronic reading 
room and annual reports and prioritize their participation based on 
agency performance and the significance of the adjustment applications.   
 
IV. THE POTENTIAL OF THE BACK-END 
 
 For years, critics of environmental and other forms of regulation 
have criticized prevailing methods of regulation as unnecessary, 
inefficient, unduly burdensome, or otherwise irrational.  Although the 
critics’ calls for reform have not convinced Congress to repeal existing 
regulatory schemes, Congress has imposed on agencies such as EPA a 
series of analytical obligations with which agencies must comply before 
they may adopt new regulations.  Additional such requirements have 
been adopted by executive order.  Supporters of these techniques assert 
that they will improve the rationality of regulation.  Cost-benefit 
analysis, for example, is supposed to assure that agencies do not adopt 
counterproductive regulations whose economic costs exceed the 
environmental, health, or safety benefits that result from regulation. 
 We have argued in our book on risk regulation, and others have 
argued elsewhere, that the effort to improve the rationality of regulation 
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at the front end of the regulatory process by heaping on agencies a 
plethora of analytical obligations such as the obligation to undertake a 
cost-benefit analysis is misguided.  As the number of analytical 
requirements has mushroomed, it has become more difficult and time-
consuming for agencies to run the gauntlet of applicable analytical 
procedures.  The strains on agencies have been exacerbated by a scarcity 
of agency resources.  Front-end analysis therefore creates the risk of less 
agency regulation as agencies devote more and more time to each 
regulatory project.  Moreover, the new analytical requirements do not 
necessarily improve regulatory policy.  The problem of bounded 
rationality makes it difficult, if not impossible, for agencies to provide 
accurate and useful information in performing front-end analytical tasks, 
such as cost-benefit analysis.  If such techniques are incapable of 
calculating the optimal level of regulation, then agencies forced to rely 
on them may wind up delaying issuance of regulations while they 
conduct their analyses with no assurance of improved quality of eventual 
regulatory output. 
 We took the position in our book on risk regulation that a better 
approach to improving regulatory policy is for agencies to focus 
increased attention on the back end of the regulatory process instead of 
seeking to perfect regulation through ad nauseum front-end analysis.  
Back-end adjustments can provide a safety net to protect against the risk 
of erroneous or incomplete decisions when agencies initially adopt 
regulations.  The availability of this safety net may make agencies more 
comfortable in issuing regulations that have not been analyzed to death.  
Agencies are likely to have more accurate information at the back end of 
the process than at the front end because back-end analysis typically 
takes place when agencies already have had some experience in 
administering the applicable regulatory scheme.  Back-end adjustments, 
therefore, should be less susceptible to the problem of bounded 
rationality than front-end analysis. 
 In this Article, we surveyed five federal statutes designed to protect 
the public health, safety, and the environment to determine whether these 
statutes provide agencies with the opportunity to make back-end 
adjustments.  Our survey reveals that these statutes authorize EPA, 
OSHA, and the Department of the Interior to issue back-end adjustments 
on at least five different grounds, each of which has the potential to 
improve regulatory policy in the context of individualized regulatory 
applications.  Although we have, for the most part, endorsed these back-
end techniques, we also have suggested some limitations, such as 
eliminating the availability of hardship-based adjustments from 
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technology-forcing regulations and the adoption of a requirement that the 
recipients of some kinds of back-end adjustments demonstrate that the 
relief they seek will not subject the public health and safety or the 
environment to unacceptable levels of risk. 
 We recognize that the resort to back-end adjustments creates the risk 
of regulatory failure if agencies issue adjustments that, either 
individually or cumulatively, allow levels of pollution or other harm-
creating activity that are inconsistent with statutory goals.  But front-end 
analytical requirements also create a risk of regulatory failure.  An 
agency determined to avoid meaningful regulation, for example, can 
skew its cost-benefit analysis by ignoring or deemphasizing the 
unquantifiable benefits that a regulation is designed to produce.  The 
greater the costs appear to be in relation to the resulting regulatory 
benefits, the less protective the regulation issued by the agency in 
reliance on that cost-benefit analysis is likely to be.  Consequently, the 
risk of capture or other regulatory failure is not, by itself, a convincing 
reason to prefer front-end analysis to back-end adjustments.  That risk 
may be troublesome, however, if oversight of the agency is less effective 
at the back end than at the front end of the regulatory process.  There is a 
legitimate concern that public interest groups will find it more difficult to 
monitor agency decisions at the back end than at the front end because 
those decisions will be more numerous, more dispersed, and less visible.  
To counter that danger, we recommend that all back-end adjustments 
continue to be subject to a notice and comment process.  In addition, we 
support the adoption of requirements that are designed to improve the 
transparency of the decision-making process, including the establishment 
of electronic reading rooms and the submission of annual reports on 
back-end activity.  These steps will allow agencies to rely on back-end 
adjustments to improve regulatory policy while minimizing the risk of 
abuse through the issuance of excessive or unwarranted back-end 
adjustments. 
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